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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A fundamental characteristic of human information processing is its limited capacity. 
Despite the myriad sources of information impinging our senses, we are only able to fully 
process a small portion of that information (Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1980; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Dux & Marois, 2009; Marois & 
Ivanoff, 2005). Capacity limited attentional mechanisms have been long thought to be the means 
by which incoming information can be filtered for the behaviorally relevant components 
(Broadbent, 1981; Neisser & Lazar, 1964; Triesman, 1964). Potentially important information 
can be identified by either its relevance to currently held goals or by its intrinsic salience 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Egeth, Virzi, & Garbart, 1984; Jonides, 1981; Petersen & Posner, 
2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). The neurobiological and 
phenomenological fate of selected information is the subject of a complementary question, “what 
mechanisms allow for conscious access to the selected information?” In other words, once 
selected via attentional mechanisms, how do humans become consciously aware of a particular 
piece of information? Despite William James’s (1890) proclamation over a century ago that 
“everyone knows what attention is,” the theoretical and experimental debate over how selective 
attention biases information and ultimately reaches awareness continues. 
 Very often, modern views of the neurobiological substrates underlying attention and 
awareness, as well as many other cognitive functions, take what I will describe as a “network-
level” perspective. This network-level viewpoint argues that cognitive functions use a multi-
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focal set of activations in the brain to produce flexible deployment of mental functions 
(Mesulam, 1990). Distinct collections of activations will underlie distinct cognitive functions, 
such as language, attention, memory, or executive control (Mesulam, 1990; Posner, Petersen, 
Fox, & Raichle, 1988). The hypothesized neurobiological bases of selective attention and 
conscious awareness are two primary examples of cognitive operations with widely popularized 
network-level (i.e. a limited set of coordinated brain regions) theories (Beck et al., 2001; 
Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Lumer & Rees, 1999; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005). Ultimately, however, 
behavior is not an expression of any one cognitive process, but rather the coordination of 
numerous cognitive and physiological operations. Incoming perceptual information must be 
widely distributed to each of the various, more specialized processing systems of the brain while 
also maintaining a subjectively unified conscious experience of the world (Baars, 2005; Baars, 
2002). Consequently, it is vital that we examine the whole brain to fully understand the processes 
like attention and awareness. 
 In this dissertation, I aim to further explore theories of the neurobiological bases of 
attention and awareness. In particular, I will contrast predictions made by network-level theories 
with those made by theories developed in the context of the whole-brain nature of behavior. To 
preview the conclusions presented here, these cognitive processes often generate diffuse 
functional changes beyond the brain regions typically identified in imaging activation studies.  
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Network-Level Neurobiological Theories of Awareness and Attention 
 
 How the brain begets conscious awareness has been one of the most fundamental and 
elusive problems in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy. Correspondingly, this problem 
has spawned a remarkably large number of theories that differ by the proposed extent of cortical 
and subcortical changes associated with awareness. Typically, researchers study awareness by 
contrasting the neural correlates of consciously perceived or correctly reported stimuli with the 
neural correlates of either masked or sub-threshold presentations. Not surprisingly, due to the 
heterogeneity in task demands of these studies, there is significant heterogeneity in the proposed 
neural correlates of conscious (Kim & Blake, 2005; Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & 
Pessoa, 2008). Three general classes of theories describe the range of proposed cortical 
recruitment necessary to produce the conscious percept of awareness and the ability to access 
that information: focal, network-level, and global theories. According to ‘focal’ theories, 
awareness results from the recruitment of individual cortical regions or highly circumscribed 
neuronal populations restricted to a single macroscopic region of the brain. Proposals vary as to 
the location of the minimally necessary activation, with various theories suggesting only local 
changes in neural activity in either the perceptual substrates (Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Tse, 
Martinez-Conde, Schlegel, & Macknik, 2005; Zeki, 2007) or in higher-level nodes of 
information processing pathways (Lau & Passingham, 2006) are necessary. Zeki’s “micro-
consciousness” proposal, for example, argues that awareness of individual visual properties, such 
as color and motion, requires only recruitment of the appropriate visual circuitry involved in 
perception. Due to the observation that color could be perceived prior to the perception of 
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motion, he argues that there can not be a single unitary awareness (Arnold, Clifford, & 
Wenderoth, 2001; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Zeki, 2007). 
 ‘Network-level’ theories posit that awareness results from the recruitment of attention-
related networks in the brain. Many studies comparing the neural correlates of seen and unseen 
stimuli with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have shown recruitment of these 
fronto-parietal areas (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Beck et al., 2001; Lumer & 
Rees, 1999; Lumer, Friston, & Rees, 1998; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; 
Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002). Numerous paradigms for examining seen and unseen stimuli 
with fMRI have produced attention-network or similar fronto-parietal activations, including 
studies of change blindness (Beck et al., 2001), binocular rivalry (Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer & 
Rees, 1999), the attentional blink (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Feinstein, Stein, 
Castillo, & Paulus, 2004; Kranczioch, Debener, Schwarzbach, Goebel, & Engel, 2005; Marois, 
Yi, & Chun, 2004), bistable perception (Hahn et al., 2007; Kleinschmidt, Büchel, Zeki, & 
Frackowiak, 1998; Sterzer, Kleinschmidt, & Rees, 2009), threshold stimuli (Boly et al., 2007; 
Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, & Kleinschmidt, 2009), and masked stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2001; 
Haynes, Driver, & Rees, 2005). 
   Finally, a third class of models has found increased prominence within the last decades. 
These “global” models reflect an alternative perspective as to what comprises the necessary 
mechanisms for the percept of conscious awareness. These theories suggest that there are 
widespread changes in the activation state (Baars, 2005; Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Changeux, 
2011; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006) and functional connectivity 
(Edelman, 2003; Tononi, 2008; Tononi & Sporns, 2003; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012) of the brain. 
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A common component between these theories is that without a unified, global recruitment of 
cortical and subcortical mechanisms, the unified conscious experience does not form.  
 Whereas there is substantial disagreement as to the neurobiological substrates of 
awareness, theorized cortical areas controlling the allocation of attention in the brain enjoy a 
modicum of agreement. Two separable networks control goal-driven and stimulus-driven 
orienting respectively (Corbetta, 1998; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Yantis et al., 2002). The 
endogenous, or goal-driven, control of attention is attributed to the dorsal attention work, 
comprised principally of bilateral human frontal eye fields (FEF) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
regions (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kastner, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1998; 
Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999). The dorsal network is thought to be 
involved in both spatial and non-spatial deployment of attention (Moore, 2003; Schall, 2002; 
Serences, 2004; K. G. Thompson, Biscoe, & Sato, 2005), and accordingly, electrical stimulation 
of the monkey FEF produces saccades (Schall, 2002). However, shifts of attention do not require 
overt eye movements, and stimulation below saccade threshold in the monkey FEF produces 
perceptual benefits without producing an eye movement (Moore, 2003). Neuroimaging in 
humans reveals activation in the human FEF region during covert shifts of attention in space as 
well as recruitment of the superior parietal lobule (Corbetta, 1998; Yantis et al., 2002). However, 
no spatial shift is necessary to recruit dorsal attention regions and can occur when shifting 
attention between overlapping objects (Serences, Schwarzbach, Courtney, Golay, & Yantis, 
2004a) as well as shifts between categorical rules (Chiu & Yantis, 2009). FEF and IPS are 
additionally recruited following preparatory cues, reflecting their role in the preparation and 
execution of goal-directed attention (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & Shulman, 2000; 
Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Kastner et al., 1999; G. L. Shulman et al., 1999), a 
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finding confirmed through meta-analysis of both fMRI and PET studies (Wager, Jonides, & 
Reading, 2004).  
 In contrast to goal-directed attention, the stimulus-driven orienting of attention is 
hypothesized to be supported by a ventral network (Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002) of regions including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), inferior frontal junction (IFJ), 
and anterior insula (AI) that overlaps with a related ‘salience’ network in AI and dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC)(V. Menon, 2011; V. Menon & Uddin, 2010). Activity in ventral 
attention network is generally modulated by detection of unattended, salient events (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002). This attention network also shows sensitivity to capture of attention by targets 
occurring at unexpected locations (Arrington, Carr, Mayer, & Rao, 2000; Corbetta et al., 2000; 
Kincade, Abrams, Astafiev, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2005; Vossel, Thiel, & Fink, 2006), 
contingent capture of attention by stimuli sharing target features at an irrelevant location 
(Serences et al., 2005), as well as oddball stimuli (Bledowski, Prvulovic, Goebel, Zanella, & 
Linden, 2004; Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Marois, Leung, & Gore, 2000; M. 
Stevens, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2005). Recruitment of the ventral attention network occurs across 
multiple sensory modalities (Astafiev, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2006; Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, 
& Davis, 2000; 2002), does not require spatial shifts of attention (Marois et al., 2000), and will 
respond to individual features of an object (Downar et al., 2000). Completely task irrelevant, 
surprising images have also been shown to produce recruitment of the ventral attention network 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a).  
  However, despite these well-characterized activations for goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention, both dorsal and ventral network regions will often co-activate with a larger set 
of regions thought to embody more generalized cognitive control networks (Duncan, 2010; M. 
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Fox, Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2006). These coactivations have been referred to as a 
“multiple demand network” (Duncan, 2006; Duncan & Owen, 2000), “task activation ensemble” 
(Seeley et al., 2007),“cognitive control network” (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Cole, Pathak, & 
Schneider, 2010), “fronto-parietal control system” (Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 
2008), and “task control network” (Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008; 
Dosenbach et al., 2007; Petersen & Posner, 2012). Together, these hypothesized networks cross 
wide swaths of cortex, extending from posterior parietal and extrastriate cortex to anterior and 
lateral prefrontal regions in addition to portions of cortex within the medial walls of the brain. 
These “task-positive” regions (M. D. Fox et al., 2005) co-activate across a wide-ranging set of 
cognitively demanding tasks. The various nomenclatures refer to similar anatomical constituents 
but often offer different explanations of network function. For example, there is dispute as to 
whether these activations constitute a single network or multiple sub-networks. One theorized 
subdivision within the task-positive set can be placed between areas responsible for coordinating 
cognitive control, a broad class of functions responsible for the flexible adaptation of information 
processing to current goals and tasks (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Dosenbach et al., 2008; Duncan, 
2006; 2010; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Uddin et al., 2010), and those responsible for the orienting 
of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Each of these theories hypothesizes specialized 
functions for individual regions and do not necessarily preclude existence of sub-specialized 
connectivity within the broader network (Duncan, 2010; Hon, Epstein, Owen, & Duncan, 2006; 
R. Thompson & Duncan, 2009) predicted by other theories (Dosenbach et al., 2007; 2008; 
Seeley et al., 2007).  
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Utilizing Graph Theory  
 
 One thread of neuroimaging research that has reinforced network-level views of brain 
function comes from connectivity literature. Connectivity approaches have been one of the 
fastest growing segments of fMRI research over the last decade (Friston, 2011b) and have 
contributed significantly to our understanding of network function. For example, the discovery 
that many cortical areas display coordinated, spontaneous activity while not engaged in any overt 
task cements this notion that common activity is distributed between numerous regions (i.e. 
network-level), rather than being localized to circumscribed, single regions (M. D. Fox et al., 
2005). Additionally, the entire global class of theories of awareness is predicated on the notion 
that widespread connectivity contributes to the formation of the conscious percept (Baars, 2005; 
Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; Tononi & Edelman, 1998; Tononi, SPORNS, & 
Edelman, 1994). There are numerous methodologies with which to study the connections 
between brain regions including analysis of the structural connections as well as functionally 
derived measures (Friston, 2011b; Friston, Frith, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1993). These 
methodologies provide a measure of some pairwise connection, be it structural, correlational, or 
effective between two brain locations.  
 The connectivity literature presents a complex view of these networks’ function. For 
example, both the attention and cognitive control networks described above all show resting state 
connectivity amongst constituent regions (Cole, Bassett, Power, Braver, & Petersen, 2014; 
Dosenbach et al., 2007; M. D. Fox et al., 2005; M. Fox et al., 2006; He, Chen, & Evans, 2007), 
but this finding is not unanimous and differential maps may be found depending on where they 
were seeded from (Power et al., 2011; Vincent et al., 2008). Examinations of the structural 
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relationships between regions can provide some sense as to the anatomical and therefore 
potentially functional similarity between regions that may not be correlated at rest (de Schotten 
et al., 2011). Task-concurrent functional connectivity studies reveal that task demands can 
potentially cause individual regions to switch network membership (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & 
Marois, 2010a; Weissman & Prado, 2012) and effective measures yield results highlighting the 
directional nature of the some of these connections (Friston, Moran, & Seth, 2013; Rogers, 
Morgan, Newton, & Gore, 2007). These are only a small fraction of the studies highlighting the 
complex relationships between areas that serve similar cognitive functions. The many-to-one 
mapping of function (e.g. the many cognitive control theories described above) to cortical region 
complicates the notion that individual networks may ultimately embody the necessary neural 
mechanisms to produce particular cognitive processes and behavior.  
 Graph theoretical and network scientific approaches to research represent a shift towards 
the importance of looking at not just individual regions, not just networks, but hierarchically 
organized, dynamic relationships between networks (Park & Friston, 2013). Graph theory can 
use structural, functional, or effective connectivity to compliment studies of functional 
activations while expanding on the notion that coordinated activity between networks may be 
particularly important making connecting links between behavior and brain function (Bullmore 
& Sporns, 2009; Sporns, 2011). At its simplest, graph theory is a branch mathematics that deals 
with the pair-wise relationships between components of a network. However, as a tool for 
describing the interactions between connected parts, it is incredibly flexible and generalizable. Its 
use in the context of describing neurobiological networks has grown in popularity within the last 
decade (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). In graph theoretical parlance, components of a system are 
referred to as “nodes” and the connections between them as “edges.” From the perspective of 
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cognitive neuroscience, node definition depends on the methodology being used. For MRI 
analyses, individual voxels or regions of interest (ROIs) typically constitute the nodes of the 
neural system. The connections (edges) between them can be measured using any pair-wise 
measure of similarity (e.g. the Pearson correlation). 
 Remarkably, many of the same network structures observed in other self-organizing 
systems also appear in the brain (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). These networks, dubbed “small-
world,” display efficient patterns of information transfer by routing many connections through a 
few, highly interconnected hub regions (Sporns, Honey, & Kötter, 2007; Watts & Strogatz, 
1998). Watts & Strogatz (1998) show that the United States power grid, the neural network of C. 
elegans, and a network of actors common to the same movies all display similar small-world 
properties. A core feature of this organization is that it appears to provide a balance for two 
driving features of networked systems: specialization and integration (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; 
Cole et al., 2014; Power et al., 2011). Like the brain, these systems require sub-components to 
perform specialized computation that, when integrated with other sub-components, produced an 
emergent or global behavior. Ultimately, graph theoretical research provides novel utility 
towards the study of neurobiological systems by offering a language and analytical methods with 
which describe both the components and holistic structure of a network. 
 The individual components, nodes and edges, of these networks can be described in how 
they interact amongst themselves to form small, highly interconnected communities, or modules 
(Fig. 1). Questions about the connections made by an individual node provide a low-level entry 
point of analysis. The extent to which a node displays high “degree”, or many connections, 
provides a perspective on its “centrality”, or usefulness, for efficient communication (Bullmore 
& Sporns, 2009; 2012). A node that lies on the path between many other nodes, like a central 
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terminal of a train route, can be described as a “hub” with vital importance for integrating the 
specialized functions of individual sub-networks (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; van den Heuvel & 
Sporns, 2013). Analysis of the “modular” structure of the overall network examines connectivity 
in a all-inclusive manner, taking into account all pairwise connections between regions to 
generate a plausible structural or functional organization(Sporns & Betzel, 2015). The 
application to neuroscientific research becomes obvious due to the frequency with which the 
brain, at many spatial scales, is described as functioning like a network. Questions about the role 
of an individual cortical region and its integrative properties can be described in terms of its 
mathematically derived centrality and hub properties. The emergent structure of networks and 
how they communicate with one another can be assessed by the modularity and small-world 
properties they display. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of basic graph theoretical structures. Nodes (circles) and edges (connecting 
lines) represent the basic structure of the network, potentially embodying individual regions of 
the brain and the functional or structural connections between them. Highly interconnected 
clusters of nodes form modules whereas a highly connected individual node acts as a hub. 
Module	
Within	module	
edge	
Between	
module	edge	
Hub	Node	
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 The last decade has seen an explosion of studies focusing on the connectivity properties 
of the brain above and beyond just the activation patterns observed with non-invasive methods 
(Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Friston, 2011a; Sporns & Betzel, 2015). Following on the heels of 
these advances in the study of functional connections, network science and graph theory has 
commensurately exploded in neuroscience. The graph theoretical perspective has begun to 
address connectivity differences in clinical populations (Ahmadlou, Rostami, & Sadeghi, 2012; 
Bachiller et al., 2014; Caeyenberghs et al., 2012; de Haan et al., 2012; King et al., 2013; Lord et 
al., 2011; Nomura et al., 2010; Sheffield, Repovs, Harms, Carter, Gold, MacDonald, Daniel 
Ragland, et al., 2015a; Sheffield, Repovs, Harms, Carter, Gold, MacDonald, Ragland, et al., 
2015b) as well as task-dependent changes in connectivity in typically-developing populations  
(Bassett et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2014; 2013; Crossley et al., 2013; De Vico Fallani et al., 2008; 
Ekman, Derrfuss, Tittgemeyer, & Fiebach, 2012; Ginestet & Simmons, 2011; Hermundstad et 
al., 2013; Kitzbichler, Henson, Smith, Nathan, & Bullmore, 2011; Nicol et al., 2012; S. Palva, 
Monto, & Palva, 2010; Rosenberg et al., 2015; A. A. Stevens, Tappon, Garg, & Fair, 2012). Few 
graph theory studies have focused on the dynamic properties of attention or awareness. These 
studies have examined graph changes during tasks requiring cognitive control shifts (Cole et al., 
2013; Ekman et al., 2012) and during maintenance of items in working memory (Cao et al., 
2014; Ginestet & Simmons, 2011; Kitzbichler et al., 2011; S. Palva & Palva, 2012), but they 
have not focused on how these cognitive processes effect connectivity from a global perspective.  
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Specific Aims 
 
 The overarching goal of this dissertation is to extend our understanding of attention and 
awareness by examining the global network properties of these cognitive states using graph 
theoretical measures. Cognitive neuroscience research often focuses on the role of individual 
cortical regions and network-level activity, potentially neglecting the whole-brain changes 
associated with cognitive function and behavior. The experiments in this dissertation aim to 
expand on the role of the brain’s complex functional topology by leveraging recent advancement 
in graph theoretical tools for studying neural connections.  
 
Aim 1: Characterize the global network properties of visual awareness. 
 A theoretical debate exists as to the extent of neural activity necessary to produce a 
conscious percept of some piece of information. As described in the preceding sections, focal 
and network-level theories of awareness posit that relatively restricted activity in sensory and/or 
specific association cortices is sufficient to produce conscious awareness. However, several 
“global” theories suggest much more widespread changes are associated with awareness of a 
percept. Network science provides a well-suited perspective and set of tools for adjudicating 
between these opposing viewpoints. Chapter II of this dissertation (Godwin, Barry, & Marois, 
2015) discusses the network properties of target awareness and presents evidence in favor of 
global theories of awareness.  
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Aim 2: Identify global, functional network properties of attentional capture by salient oddballs. 
 Highly salient visual stimuli produce a powerful orienting response, a involuntary 
physiological and cognitive redirection to perceptually interesting items (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 
1963). In the brain, detection of task-irrelevant, oddball stimuli has been shown to consistently 
recruit a ventral fronto-parietal network consisting of the anterior insula (AI), temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), and the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). However, the orienting response to novel 
or salient stimuli is comprised of a wide-ranging set of physiological and cognitive processes 
recruited in order to orient to and evaluate novel stimuli (Beatty, 1982; Han & Marois, 2014; 
Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Tracy et al., 2000). Chapter III examines the functional topology 
associated with the detection of a task-irrelevant, oddball stimulus to characterize the global 
functional changes associated with the orienting response.  
 
Aim 3: Examine the differential global network properties of task relevant and irrelevant 
information. 
 
 Chapters II and III respectively examine the global network function related to relevant 
targets and irrelevant oddballs. However, these studies are not designed to test the relationship of 
these influences of information processing concurrently. Chapter IV of this dissertation tests 
hypotheses the patterns of global topological changes associated with the detection of task-
relevant and irrelevant stimuli by using results from Chapters II and III as functional markers of 
task relevant and task irrelevant processing.	These analyses aim to examine whether topology 
changes contribute to the process of biasing information or suppressing distractors during an 
attention task. The simultaneous examination of both relevant and irrelevant competition for 
cortical representation better reflects the experience of the natural world where innumerable 
relevant and irrelevant sources of information impinge our senses.  
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 The recruitment of specific, circumscribed networks plays a prominent role in theories of 
attention and cognitive control. There are, however, numerous disagreements as to what 
individual regions are recruited, how these areas communicate to form networks, and how those 
network coordinate activity to produce coherent behavior. The burgeoning literature and use of 
network science to study cognitive function provides a vital linking component between the 
function of individual regions or networks and the rest of the brain during behavior.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
BREAKDOWN OF THE BRAIN’S FUNCTIONAL NETWORK MODULARITY WITH 
AWARENESS 
 
This chapter is based on Godwin et al. (2015). 
 
 The debate over the neurobiological basis of conscious awareness best encapsulates the 
tensions between network-level and connectionist-based, global theories. Within this debate are 
theories that run the entire gamut of proposed neural correlates of consciousness.  Three broad 
classes of models have been proposed to explain the neural basis of awareness, and these classes 
primarily differ on the predicted extent of neural information changes associated with conscious 
perception. According to ‘focal’ theories, awareness results from local changes in neural activity 
in either the perceptual substrates (Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Tse et al., 2005; Zeki, 2007) or in 
higher-level nodes of information processing pathways (Lau & Passingham, 2006). By contrast, 
‘network-level’ theories posit that awareness is tightly associated with activation of parieto-
frontal attention networks of the brain (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Beck et al., 
2001; Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg, 
2005; Rees et al., 2002). Finally, ‘global’ models propose that awareness results from 
widespread changes in the activation state (Baars, 2005; Baars, 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; 
Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) and functional connectivity (Edelman, 2003; Tononi, 2008; Tononi 
& Sporns, 2003; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012) of the brain. While there is strong experimental 
support for network-level theories there is scant experimental evidence in favor of truly 
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sweeping, widespread changes in brain activity with conscious perception despite the fact that 
global scale models have recently come to prominence in the theoretical landscape of this field.  
 Using a graph theoretical approach applied to ultra-high field functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data, here we experimentally tested a key tenet of global theories: the 
widespread emergence of large-scale functional connectivity with awareness. Graph theory 
analyses are ideal tools to test global models of awareness because they can provide concise 
measures of the integration and segregation of interconnected nodes of a system (Bullmore & 
Sporns, 2012). Applied to functional imaging data, we treat individual brain ROIs as nodes, 
functional connectivity between as edges, and functional brain networks as interconnected 
modules of nodes. When examining a large set of ROIs that encompass the different networks of 
the human cerebral cortex (Pettersson-Yeo, Allen, Benetti, McGuire, & Mechelli, 2011; Power et 
al., 2011), we can apply graph theory analyses to estimate the extent to which key measures of 
global information processing are altered by the state of awareness. This approach has been 
previously applied to study differences in cognitive states (Bassett et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2014; 
Cole et al., 2013; Ekman et al., 2012; Ferri, Rundo, Bruni, Terzano, & Stam, 2008; Ginestet & 
Simmons, 2011; Hermundstad et al., 2013; Kitzbichler et al., 2011; A. A. Stevens et al., 2012). 
Although recent studies have taken advantage of graph theory analysis to examine the 
connectivity patterns that precedes a conscious event (Weisz et al., 2014) or following 
pharmacologically induced loss of consciousness (Schröter et al., 2012), this approach has yet to 
be used for characterizing the topology associated with conscious target perception per se, a 
necessary test for global theories of awareness.  
If the changes with awareness are truly global, one should see such changes even if the 
task does not require complex discrimination, identification, and semantic processes that may 
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recruit vast extents of cortical tissue that have not necessarily been associated with conscious 
perception; in other words, these global changes should appear even for the simple conscious 
detection of a flashed disk. For this reason, we had participants perform an elementary masked 
target detection task (Fig. 2) while being scanned at ultra-high field (7 Tesla [T]). The task 
included three trial types: Forward-Masked, Backward-Masked, and No-Target conditions. In the 
Forward-Masked (paracontrast) condition, a 133ms-duration annular mask offset 33ms prior to 
the target (a disk whose exterior border coincided with the interior border of the annulus), 
presented for 33ms. In the Backward-Masked (metacontrast) condition the order of mask-target 
presentation was reversed while keeping all timing parameters the same. Under such conditions, 
forward masking of targets has been shown to impair target detection more than backward 
masking (Lefton & Newman, 1976; Schiller & Smith, 1966). Consequently, the mask/target 
orderings provided a manipulation of target awareness while maintaining the same mask and 
target presentation times across both Forward- and Backward-Masked conditions. Because on 
each trial participants made a detection response about the presence or absence of the target 
followed by a confidence rating on their response, subjects’ performance could be assessed on 
both an objective (discriminability index, d’) and subjective (confidence rating) measure of 
awareness (Seth et al., 2008). In turn, only trials in which the target was either seen (Aware) or 
unseen (Unaware) at high confidence levels were used for analysis of brain imaging data. 
Finally, because the report of the percept was 12 seconds removed from the stimulus 
presentations (Fig. 2), the task design precluded initiation of the motor response itself from 
influencing estimates of awareness. Although response selection and motor preparation 
processes likely occur during this period, similar preparation would occur across all conditions. 
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Figure 2. Schematic of behavioral paradigm with Forward-Masked and Backward-Masked trial 
types (No-Target trials not shown). On each trial, participants responded whether or not they 
detected the target stimulus and indicated a confidence rating for their answer (see Methods). 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-eight individuals (aged 18-33; fifteen females), recruited from the Vanderbilt 
University community, participated in the study. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board approved the experimental 
protocol and informed consent was obtained from all subjects. Data from four participants were 
excluded due to technical difficulties (two participants), excessive head motion (> 6 mm; one 
participant), and failure to follow task instructions (one participant). 
 
Behavioral Paradigm  
 Stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, 
Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). All 
stimuli were shown overlaid on a white background with a persistent, centered, black fixation 
square (.25° visual angle). Participants were instructed to monitor each trial for a target stimulus, 
ignoring a mask stimulus. The target stimulus, a filled gray disc (1° visual angle), was presented 
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at the center of the screen for 33 ms. The mask was a centered, black annulus (from 1° inner 
edge to 2° outer edge) surrounding the target disk and was shown for 133 ms.  
 All participants saw three conditions, psuedorandomly mixed within runs: Forward-
Masked, Backward-Masked, and No Target. Forward-Masked and Backward-Masked trial types 
are shown in Figure 2. In addition, fourteen of the twenty-four participants saw rare oddball 
images in 5% of all trials. These surprise trials were not analyzed for the current study. 
 Each trial began with enlargement of the fixation square for 200ms, cuing the participants 
for the upcoming target and/or mask presentation 800 ms after the fixation returned to its 
standard size. An interstimulus interval (ISI) of 33 ms separated the mask and target on all 
target-present trials. When the mask precedes the target (forward or paracontrast masking) at 
these timing parameters, target detection is severely impaired. By contrast, when the mask 
follows the target (backward or metacontrast masking), target detection improves (Lefton & 
Newman, 1976; Schiller & Smith, 1966). A 12 s fixation interval followed the stimulus 
presentations to allow the BOLD signal for target detection to be dissociated from the target 
response BOLD signal (see fMRI methods below). Following the 12 s interval, participants 
responded to an on-screen prompt (1.5 s) whether they had detected the target stimulus, using 
one of two right-handed button presses for “yes” or “no”. Participants were then prompted (1.5 s) 
to provide a rating, on a scale of 1 to 5, of how confident they were in their previous detection 
response (1 = No confidence; 5 = Total confidence) with a left-handed button press. The rating 
scale remained on screen for the duration of each prompt. The next trial began following another 
11 s fixation period.  
 This stimulus presentation paradigm afforded several advantages for assessing the 
changes in global functional connectivity with target awareness. First, the reversed mask/target 
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orderings provided a manipulation of target awareness while maintaining identical mask and 
target presentation durations across both Forward and Backward Masked conditions. This 
consistency across conditions allowed examination of robust effects of target awareness without 
differences in overall physical stimulation. Moreover, our paradigm yielded robust numbers of 
trials in which the subjects were highly confident they either did or did not see the target 
(Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001). In addition, because all stimuli were presented at fixation, 
the task required no spatial shifts of attention or eye movements. Finally, by using a very simple 
stimulus target-mask presentation paradigm that only required rudimentary target stimulus 
detection (brief percept of a disk), our manipulation provides a strong test of the global theories 
of awareness because it is unlikely to evoke widespread activation associated with identification, 
discrimination, or semantic processing (as may occur, for instance, with the attentional blink 
paradigm).   
  Twenty-one of the participants completed between four and five fMRI runs (three 
completed four runs whereas the remaining 18 completed five runs), each consisting of twenty 
trials split between the Backward-Masked, Forward-Masked and No-Target trials (35%, 35%, 
30% respectively). Three additional participants completed between five and eight fMRI (one 
completing five runs, one completing six runs, and one completing eight runs) runs consisting of 
fifteen trials each (5 of each of the three trial types). Trial types were presented in a pseudo-
randomized order in each run. Trials during which participants failed to provide either a 
detection response or a confidence rating were excluded from analysis (<1% of all trials). 
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fMRI methods 
 Stimuli were presented using an Avotec SV-6011 projector (Avotec, Inc. Stuart, FL.) 
back-projected onto a screen inside the scanner. Participants lying in the scanner viewed the 
screen through a mirror mounted to the head coil. The experiment was performed at the 
Vanderbilt University Institute of Imaging Sciences on a 7T Philips Achieva MRI system to 
benefit from high sensitivity to blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals (Gati, 
Menon, Ugurbil, & Rutt, 1997; Ogawa et al., 1993) while providing full-brain coverage at 
conventional imaging resolutions. Whole brain, anatomical T1 weighted images were acquired 
with a 1x1x1 mm voxel resolution. Functional T2* images were acquired using a 3D PRESTO 
(Principles of Echo Shifting using a Train of Observations) sequence with 3x3x3 mm voxels and 
a 1 s volume acquisition time (Barry et al., 2011). Scan parameters consisted of a 10 ms 
repetition time (TR), 14 ms echo time (TE), 10° flip angle, 216 mm x 216 mm in-plane field of 
view (FOV), 72 × 72 matrix, and 40 slices (covering 120 mm superior-inferior). Each functional 
scan included either 410 brain volumes (Subjects 1-12) or 545 brain volumes (Subjects 13-24).  
Data preprocessing was performed using Brain Voyager QX 2.3 (Brain Innovation, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands) and included 3D head motion correction and linear trend removal. 
Functional and anatomical runs were co-registered and transformed into standard Talairach space 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). 
 
Functional Connectivity Analysis 
 Cortical regions of interest (ROIs) were first defined from the set of coordinates reported 
in Power et al. (2011), in which authors identified nodes based on resting-state connectivity data 
with strong overlap with known functional-network systems. These nodes were parceled into 
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sub-graphs based on community detection algorithms resulting in strong concordance with 
previously identified functional networks. Coordinates, originally reported in MNI space, were 
converted to Talairach space using the mni2tal.m function in MATLAB (Matthew Brett). Four-
mm radius spheres were drawn around each coordinate to create a list of 264 ROIs to serve as 
nodes for graph theoretical analyses.  
 In order to examine connectivity differences associated with target awareness with 
maximum power, Hit and Miss trials were each collapsed across both Forward and Backward 
Masked trials, yielding a total of 486 high-confidence Hit trials and 276 high-confidence Miss 
trials. High-confidence trials were defined as those with “4” or “5” ratings on the 5-point 
confidence scale. Given that each condition (Hit and Miss) was comprised of trials primarily 
originating from one masking condition (Backwards and Forward, respectively), we also 
performed the Hit vs. Miss analyses on high-confidence trials within each masking condition to 
confirm that the results were not due to masking differences. Although the results of this analysis 
by masking conditions are consistent with the main findings, they suffer from low power because 
several subjects lacked a sufficient number of high-confidence trials of one trial type to make 
these comparisons statistically meaningful. Consequently, to further rule out the possibility that 
changes in connectivity differences with awareness may be due to masking differences, we also 
compared False Alarm and Correct Rejection trials of the no-target condition, as these two trial 
types are associated with very difference percepts but identical physical presentations.  
 Task-dependent functional connectivity between nodes was estimated using the 
generalized psychophysiological interaction (gPPI) method (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 
2012). This method aims to account for task-activation effects and non-task-specific correlations 
separately from task-induced connectivity differences (Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, & Friston, 
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2003). GPPI is considered to be more powerful than a “standard” PPI analysis (Cisler, Bush, & 
Steele, 2014) and has been shown to be a better estimate of task-based functional connectivity 
than a cross-correlation coefficient (Kim & Horwitz, 2008). It utilizes the general linear model 
(GLM) with three regressor types: condition-specific task regressors (analogous to those used in 
standard fMRI GLMs), a “seed” timecourse regressor, and condition-specific interaction 
regressors. The seed timecourse regressor is included to capture signal variance in regions that 
show correlations with the seed region outside of task periods of interest. Interaction regressors 
were created using the deconvolution method described in McLaren et al. (2012). In essence, 
interaction regressors predict correlation with seed region signal, but only during task-relevant 
timepoints (capturing an interaction of seed and condition factors). Our GLMs included 
condition-specific regressors for high and low confidence Hit and Miss trials. Each GLM 
consisted of condition-specific regressors (modeled as events locked to target/mask 
presentation), a seed node BOLD time course, and condition-specific interaction regressors, all 
in addition to task regressors of no interest for fixation and response periods. Parameter estimates 
for high confidence interaction regressors were recorded and organized for graph theoretical 
analyses. 
 A separate GLM was run was for each of the 264 possible seeds for each subject. For 
each seed region, averaged parameter estimates for gPPI interaction regressors were extracted 
from and averaged across voxels in the 263 remaining ROIs providing a task-modulated measure 
of weighted (as opposed to binary) connectivity between each region pair. Larger parameter 
estimates indicate greater signal coherence between seed and target ROI and thus greater 
functional connectivity. No directionality was assumed in the data and reciprocal pairwise 
connections were averaged to generate the final, symmetric graph. PPI analyses were performed 
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using Brain Voyager QX 2.3 and custom MATLAB software in addition to the BVQXtools and 
NeuroElf toolboxes.  
 
Graph Theoretical Analysis 
 Graph theoretical analyses were performed using the Brain Connectivity Toolbox 
(Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). Graphs (i.e. ROIs and their functional connections) were constructed 
and analyzed on an individual subject basis for each condition of interest (e.g. high-confidence 
hit, high-confidence miss trials). As noted in Rubinov & Sporns (2010), network properties often 
differ based on the number of nodes, connections, and degree distribution of a network. To 
construct network measures that allow comparisons across conditions/graphs that might differ 
along any of these properties, graph theory metrics are “normalized” by comparing – on a per 
subject basis – each of these metrics against a null hypothesis network; i.e. a network with a 
randomized topology that otherwise conserves the size, density, and degree distribution of the 
original network. All graph theoretic measures were normalized via division by their respective 
metric averaged across 100 random graphs generated via the Brain Connectivity Toolbox 
function “randmio_und.m”  Statistical significance of normalized graph theoretic measures was 
performed via Wilcoxon sign-rank tests given the lack of evidence concerning the normal 
distribution of graph theoretic metrics (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). Because graph theoretic 
metrics can be threshold-dependent (van Wijk, Stam, & Daffertshofer, 2010), it is important to 
examine graph measurements over a range of possible connection densities. In accordance with 
prior studies (Cao et al., 2014; Dosenbach et al., 2008; Rubinov et al., 2009), results were 
obtained for graphs density thresholded at the top 10% to 30% of individual subject connections, 
with 5% steps, for a total of five threshold levels. Results are presented for the top 10% of 
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connections. Thresholded matrices were rescaled to the range [0,1] (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). 
This normalization procedure was calculated by dividing each connectivity value by the 
maximum value in the graph in order to rescale values to a similar range as correlations.  
 Following the approach of previous work in the field, no correction for multiple 
comparisons across the multiple measures of network properties were applied because of the 
non-independence of these measures (Cao et al., 2014; Rubinov & Sporns, 2010; 2011) and 
because the current study aims only to test the global patterns of topology, rather than the 
independent properties of individual nodes or ROIs. Correction for multiple comparisons is 
normally applied when testing several ROIs (Bassett, Nelson, Mueller, Camchong, & Lim, 2012; 
Lynall et al., 2010; Schröter et al., 2012) or if statistical significance (on a per voxel basis) acts 
as a thresholding step (Bassett et al., 2009; E. T. Bullmore & Bassett, 2011; Cole et al., 2014; 
Dosenbach et al., 2007; Rubinov & Sporns, 2011). The statistical reliability of our findings was 
provided by a test of replication; the same results were obtained in two independent data 
analyses: comparisons of Hits vs. Misses as well as the comparison of False Alarms vs. Correct 
Rejections. 
 In order to measure changes in the graph properties of connections across the brain’s 
neural network as a function of our awareness manipulation, we describe connectivity based on 
measures of functional segregation, functional integration, and centrality (Rubinov & Sporns, 
2010). To estimate the functional segregation of the brain’s connectivity, we assessed 
“modularity”, or the amount to which a graph (i.e. our entire ROI set) can be divided into non-
overlapping modules (i.e. sub-networks of ROIs), via Newman’s spectral algorithm for weighted 
matrices (M. Newman, 2004). Weighted modularity (Qw) was calculated by: 
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𝑄! =  1𝑙! 𝑤!,!  −  𝑘!!𝑘!!𝑙! 𝜕!!,!!!,!∈!  
 
with weighted connections between nodes i and j (wi,j), sum of all weights in a graph (lw), 
weighted degree of a node (ki), module containing node i (mi), and 𝜕!!,!! = 1 if mi = mj. 
Based on the modules identified by Newman’s algorithm we examined the “participation 
coefficient” (yw), or the degree to which nodes (i.e. ROIs) connect with nodes in other functional 
modules (sub-networks). Participation provides a measure of centrality per node; that is, a 
measure of a node’s importance in inter-modular communication. Nodes with high participation 
increase global integration by facilitating between-module communications. The participation 
coefficient was calculated by: 
 
𝑦!! = 1 −  𝑘!! 𝑚𝑘!! !!∈!  
 
where kiw(m) is the weighted degree of connections between node i and nodes in module m. 
 We additionally measured each node’s “clustering coefficient”, a measure of the degree 
of segregation present in a network that estimates the extent to which connectivity is clustered 
around each node irrespective of its module membership. The clustering coefficient (Cw), where 
ti is the number of triangles around node I, is calculated with the following formula:  
 
𝐶!  =  1𝑛 2𝑡!!𝑘! 𝑘! − 1!∈!  
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Finally, “average path length” (Lw), a measure of network integration, provided a statistic 
describing the functional distance between nodes, where di,j  is the shortest path length between 
nodes i and j, computed with a inverse mapping of weight to length.  
 
𝐿!  =  1𝑛 𝑑!"!!∈!,!!!𝑛 − 1!∈!  
 
Further descriptions of how these metrics are calculated and their implications can be found in 
Rubinov & Sporns (2010).  
 As a measure of non-parametric effect size, we report the dependent measures probability 
of superiority, or PSdep (Grissom & Kim, 2012). PSdep is defined as  
 𝑃𝑆!"# =  𝑛!𝑁  
 
where n+ is the number of positive difference scores, discarding ties and N is the sample size. 
PSdep ranges from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted simply as the proportion of paired samples 
showing greater values in one condition compared to the other.    
 
BOLD Activation Maps for Awareness 
  In order to isolate regions activated by awareness of the target stimulus, a separate model 
was defined (a non-PPI, GLM analysis) for trials in which the participant successfully detected 
the target (hits) and trials when participants reported not having seen the target (misses), 
collapsing across Forward- and Backward-Masked trials to increase power. In addition, high-
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confidence trials and low-confidence trials were modeled separately, resulting in four separate 
regressors: high-confidence hits, high-confidence misses, low-confidence hits, and low 
confidence misses. To isolate awareness-sensitive regions, high-confidence hit trials were 
directly compared to high-confidence miss trials. Group random-effect statistical parametric 
maps (SPMs) of the activation differences between Aware and Unaware trials were then created 
and thresholded at p < .05, cluster corrected for multiple comparisons (Forman et al., 1995) 
utilizing the Brain Voyager cluster correction plugin. 
 
Results by Masking Condition  
 Because most of the Target Aware trials came from the Backward-Masked condition 
(~83%) whereas the Target Unaware trials primarily originated from the Forward-Masked 
condition (~84%), we assessed whether the results obtained for the data pooled across masking 
conditions also held when the analytical tests between Target Aware and Unaware trials were 
compared within each masking condition. This analysis is statistically limited, however, by the 
low trial number in some of the conditions: In the Backward-Masked condition, there were a 
total of 403 high-confidence Aware trials compared to only 45 Unaware trials, whereas the 
Forward-Masked condition included few (83) high-confidence Aware trials compared to high-
confidence Unaware trials (231). As a result, 7 of the subjects for the Backward-Masked 
condition and 12 of the subjects for the forward-masked condition were excluded from these 
analyses because they had no or too few (1 or 0 instance per run) high-confidence aware or high-
confidence unaware trials to perform the graph theory analyses with the gPPI method. 
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Results 
 
 Target discriminability was greater under the Backward-Masked condition than the 
Forward-Masked condition (main effect of masking condition, F(1,92) = 35.51, p < .001). 
Moreover, this difference in target discriminability between the Backward and Forward 
conditions increased at the highest confidence ratings (main effect of confidence rating, Fig. 3, 
F(4,92) = 9.82, p <.001). These results not only demonstrate that the masking manipulation was 
successful in affecting target detection but also indicate that high confidence ratings provide a 
robust means of distinguishing between seen and unseen targets.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Target stimuli were seen reliably more often in Backward-Masked trials compared to 
Forward- Masked trials, especially at high confidence ratings. Global connectivity analysis was 
confined to the high-confidence trials (“4” and “5” ratings) to ensure potent differences between 
aware and unaware states. Error bars show within-group standard error. 
 
To assess whether consciously Aware and Unaware target states were associated with 
distinct global patterns of functional connectivity, we compared the differences in graph 
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theoretical metrics between seen and unseen trials for high confidence ratings only. In order to 
increase the number of trials entering into the analysis, each trial type was pooled across both the 
forward and backward-masked conditions and classified as Target Aware (seen) or Unaware 
(unseen) trial types. We examined whether the results obtained for the data pooled across 
masking conditions also held for comparisons within each masking conditions.  
 Figure 4 illustrates weighted connection matrices for all pair-wise PPI parameter 
estimates, averaged across subjects, between each of the 264 cortical nodes for Target Aware and 
Unaware conditions organized using the Power et al. (2011) parcellation. Projections of the 
nodes and edges onto two-dimensional cortical representations in Figure 4 highlight the 
widespread differences in functional PPI strengths between Aware and Unaware states. It is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions about connectivity changes with awareness from visual 
inspection of these matrices or projections alone. Hence, we quantitatively assessed network 
topology changes with awareness by estimating key graph theoretical metrics – network 
segregation, integration and centrality – based on the top 10% of connection strengths (Fig. 4), 
though similar results were obtained using a range of strength thresholds. If awareness is 
associated with widespread increases in cortical functional connectivity, it would likely be 
accompanied by decreased network segregation, increased network integration, and increased 
node centrality (i.e. highly interactive nodes that facilitate functional integration).  
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Figure 4. Group-averaged, symmetric connectivity graphs for Target Aware and Unaware 
conditions thresholded at the top 10%. Node coordinates were derived from Power, et al. (2011). 
(a) Aware (top) and Unaware (bottom) matrices are organized by the 14 network assignments 
described by Power and colleagues. Heat scale indicates magnitude of interaction regressor (seed 
x condition; PPI) parameter estimates. (b) Differences between subject-averaged connectivity 
matrices plotted for Aware minus Unaware. Values were derived by subtracted subject-averaged 
graphs shown in Figure 3a. Hot colors depict stronger connections for the Aware than Unaware 
condition, whereas cool colors depict Unaware connections greater than Aware. Plots are shown 
overlaid on a surface projection for reference to anatomical direction and general location. 
Difference scores with the greatest absolute value are plotted above weaker differences. 
  
 Functional modularity, a measure of the ability to segregate the connectivity patterns into 
clearly distinct networks, decreased with target awareness (Fig. 5, Target Aware vs. Unaware; 
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .043, PSdep  = .75). Moreover, the average participation 
coefficient, a value assessing between-network connectivity strengths, was greater in the Target 
Aware condition than in the Unaware condition (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .009, PSdep = 
.67). Typically, functional network topologies are complex, with more long distance connections 
than lattice (i.e. serially connected) networks but fewer than randomly-connected networks 
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(Bullmore & Sporns, 2012). This complex topology is thought to be a functionally and 
metabolically efficient middle ground between random and lattice organizations. Changes in 
functional modularity and participation toward more “random-like” (i.e. a normalized value of 1) 
organizations suggest a shift along this efficiency spectrum to favor longer distance connections 
at the expense of segregation of functional networks (Kitzbichler et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 5. Effect of Awareness manipulation on graph theoretic measurements for Target Aware 
and Unaware trials. (a) Comparison of Target aware and Unaware trials (collapsed across target- 
present conditions). Significant differences between Aware vs. Unaware conditions were only 
observed for Modularity and Participation metrics. (b) Comparison of false alarm trials (Aware) 
to correct rejection trials (Unaware) from the No-Target condition. All y-axis values represent 
the ratio of the observed graph theory metric to the corresponding random graph metrics (see 
Methods). Error bars represent within-group standard error. Asterisks indicate significant 
differences between groups at p < .05. 
 
  Modularity and average participation coefficient were the only metrics to exhibit 
changes between Aware and Unaware conditions. The average clustering coefficient, a different 
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measure of network segregation that estimates the degree to which neighboring nodes tend to 
interconnect with one another, was not affected by the awareness manipulation (Wilcoxon’s 
signed-rank test, p = .689, PSdep = .54). The average path length, a metric of integration that 
measures the average functional distance between two nodes, did not show differences between 
Aware and Unaware conditions (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .753, PSdep = .54). Unlike 
modularity and participation coefficient, neither of these metrics takes into account module 
membership. The finding that modularity and participation coefficient – measures which are 
sensitive to changes in inter-modular communication as opposed to changes in individual node 
connectivity – are those that are altered with awareness strongly suggests that awareness is 
associated with a breakdown of the brain’s network modularity. Similar results were observed 
across a range of connectivity thresholds (Fig. 6). 
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Figure 6. Graph theoretical measures across multiple threshold levels of the main fMRI 
experiment data. Relationships between Aware and Unaware graph metrics do not change across 
the top 10% to 30% of connectivity values as assessed by PPI strength. Error bars represent 
within-group standard error. 
 
 The hypothesis that conscious target perception is associated with whole-brain functional 
connectivity changes would be strongly validated if it were replicated in an independent trial data 
set: high-confidence false alarms and correct rejections in no-target trials. These two trial types 
have physically identical stimulus presentations (no targets) and identical levels of subjective 
confidence, but very distinct percepts (Aware vs. Unaware). False alarm trials showed lower 
modularity compared to correct rejection trials (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .007, PSdep = 
.67), and average participation coefficients were higher during false alarm trials compared to 
correct rejections as well (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .0002, PSdep = .79).  Absent a target, 
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the highly confident awareness of a percept appears sufficient to alter the brain’s network 
topology. This might take place because the false alarm trials correspond to those with structured 
internal noise sufficient to trigger the simple percept of a flash (Ress & Heeger, 2003). These 
results provide converging evidence that reported perception of the target stimulus, regardless of 
masking manipulations or target presence, produces decreased functional modularity while 
increasing average participation. 
 It is conceivable that the functional connectivity changes observed with awareness arise 
from large connectivity changes between a small number of networks, rather than truly global 
topological changes. If one module or a small set of modules showed greater between-network 
connectivity changes compared to the others, it should be detectable by testing for an interaction 
between networks and target awareness state in participation coefficient (a measure of inter-
module communication). To test this possibility, we utilized the fourteen consensus networks 
identified by Power et al. (2011). Using the participation coefficients (calculated either based on 
module membership detected by our modularity calculations or based on the Power et al. (2011) 
networks as the source of module membership), we estimated the average participation 
coefficient for nodes in each of the fourteen Power et al. networks for each subject in the Target 
Aware and Unaware conditions. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant interaction 
between condition (Aware vs. Unaware) and network for either of the analytical methods (Fs 
(13,299) < 1.03, ps > .43). It is unlikely that the global modularity and participation differences 
observed in the present data between the Aware and Unaware conditions primarily stem from 
changes in a restricted set of networks. 
 If not driven by a small number of networks, perhaps our global metrics are instead 
skewed by massive connectivity changes occurring with awareness in a small number of nodes. 
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To examine this possibility, we tested the integrity of the global network to removal of the most 
highly interconnected nodes on a per-subject basis (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). If these nodes 
were singularly responsible for what appeared to be global effects, we should no longer observe 
difference in modularity and participation coefficient between Aware and Unaware conditions 
following removal of these highly connected nodes. Excluded nodes were defined as the regions 
with the greatest summed weighted connection strengths (i.e. the sum of all pairwise connections 
made by that particular node, thresholded at the top 1% (3 nodes) or 10% (27 nodes) of the most 
interconnected nodes).  
 Even after removal of these nodes, modularity still differed between Aware and Unaware, 
with greater modularity in the Unaware compared to Aware conditions (1%: p = .046; PSdep = 
0.71, 10% p = .046; PSdep = 0.71). Correspondingly, functional participation still increased with 
Awareness after this targeted attack (1%: p = .01, PSdep = 0.67; marginally at 10% p = .063, PSdep 
= 0.58). No significant differences were found for the clustering coefficient (1%, p = .732, PSdep 
= .54; 10%, p = .775, PSdep = .5) or average path length (1%, p = .753, PSdep = .54; 10%, p = .65, 
PSdep = .58). The effects of Awareness on graph theory metrics do not appear to be driven by a 
small subset of nodes showing the highest connectivity changes. 
 A final possibility that we considered was that the global connectivity changes were 
driven by the brain regions that showed significant BOLD amplitude changes with awareness (as 
identified in SPMs of the contrast of high-confidence Aware vs. high-confidence Unaware 
conditions; see Figure 7). To address this issue, we performed a similar targeted attack analysis 
as above, excluding nodes that overlapped with activated voxels in the SPMs. After removal of 
the eight nodes that were identified as overlapping with foci activated with the Awareness 
manipulation, modularity was still greater in the Unaware condition (p = .043, PSdep = 0.67), 
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whereas participation was greater in the Aware condition (p = .007, PSdep = 0.67). Again, we 
found no significant differences between average path length (p = .753, PSdep = .54) and the 
clustering coefficient (p = .797, PSdep = .5) between conditions. The brain regions that showed 
significant BOLD amplitude changes do not solely drive the global connectivity changes 
observed with the Awareness manipulation.  
 
 
Figure 7. BOLD Amplitude SPM for Awareness. Foci showing activation in the contrast of 
Aware > Unaware (high confidence trials collapsed across forward-and backward- masked 
conditions) are presented. These activations include VLPFC (-42,32,12), PreSMA (- 1,13,51), 
left MFG (-36,1,46), left and right IPL (-56,-44,40; 59,-38,35), and left IPS (-34,- 59,38). All 
coordinates (peak activations) are reported in Talairach space. Maps thresholded at p < .05, 
cluster corrected for multiple comparisons. 
 
 Taken together, these results suggest that target awareness is associated with degradation 
of modularity in the brain’s functional networks via an increase in the participation coefficient 
without changes in clustering coefficient. Awareness may be associated with a widespread 
increase in functional connectivity across modules rather than within modules. These results are 
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also in line with reports that manipulations of working memory load can increase intermodular 
communication and decrease modularity in the absence of global efficiency changes (Ginestet & 
Simmons, 2011), lending credence to our conclusion that decreased functional modularity with 
awareness results from widespread increased inter-modular connectivity.  
 
BOLD Amplitude Patterns of Awareness 
 In order to contrast the global connectivity changes with those obtained when measuring 
amplitude differences in activation with awareness, we contrasted the SPM for Target Aware vs. 
Unaware (high-confidence) trials (collapsed across masking conditions). This map revealed 
activations in a few scattered fronto-parietal locations – left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(VLPFC), pre-supplementary motor area (PreSMA), left middle frontal gyrus (MFG), bilateral 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Figure 7). There were no regions 
more activated in the Unaware compared to the Aware condition. This pattern of activations, 
which is much more circumscribed than the global changes in connectivity that we observed, is 
generally consistent with previous evidence of fronto-parietal activations with target awareness 
(Lau & Passingham, 2006; Marois et al., 2000; 2004; Tse et al., 2005).  
 
Results by Masking Condition 
 The pattern of results observed, when splitting the data across masking directions, is 
similar to that obtained in the main analysis for the top 10% of connections (Figure 8). 
Specifically both backward-masked and forward-masked tended to show a decrease in 
modularity and an increase in participation in Aware relative to Unaware trials, with no 
observable trends for clustering and distance metrics. However, as evidenced in the graph, only a 
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subset of the results reached statistical significance when broken down by masking condition. 
For backward-masked trials (metacontrast), modularity was significantly greater in the Unaware 
condition compared to the Aware condition (p  = .002, PSdep = .88). No other comparisons using 
this data broken out by masking condition reached statistical significance (p’s > .1). This is not 
surprising given that this breakdown by masking condition suffers from low power due to the 
small number of trials and subjects that could be included with this analysis. Nevertheless, the 
overall pattern of results, coupled with the False Alarm and Correct Rejection comparisons, 
suggest that the graph theory measures reported in this chapter reflect genuine changes in global 
connectivity with Awareness.  
 
Analyses excluding PPI deconvolution step 
 We have analyzed the global data using PPI excluding the deconvolution step, as 
described in MacLaren et al. (2012).  For this analysis, the interaction predictors were calculated 
as the timepoint-by-timepoint product of the task regressor and the extracted seed timecourse. 
All other aspects of the graph theoretical analysis were identical to those presented above. With 
this reanalysis at the top 10% of connection strengths, the pattern of results for functional 
Modularity remained the same as in the earlier analysis, with the average modularity in the 
Aware condition marginally lower than in the Unaware condition (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, 
p = .05, PSdep = .71). Participation was significantly greater in the Aware compared to the 
Unaware condition (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .005, PSdep = .75), as in previous analyses. 
The clustering coefficient showed a trend for being greater in the Aware condition than in the 
Unaware condition (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .07, PSdep = .63). The average functional 
path length did not significantly differ between conditions (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, p = .15, 
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PSdep = .54). Thus, without the deconvolution step, we see similar effects on modularity, 
participation coefficient, and functional path length to what was presented above. We also see a 
marginal difference in the average clustering coefficient, a trend that was not observed in any 
other iteration of our analysis. 
 
 
Figure 8. Differences in graph metrics for Aware and Unaware trials in forward- and backward-
masked conditions. (a) Results for backward-masked trials only. (b) Results for forward-masked 
trials only. Error bars represent within-group standard error. 
 
 
Pearson correlation analysis 
 To confirm our results were not simply due to an artifact of the PPI procedure, we 
reanalyzed the data with a Pearson Correlation method using Jochen Weber’s NeuroElf toolbox 
for MATLAB and custom MATLAB scripts. Using the “vtc.RegressOut” function included in 
the toolbox, we removed task-related variance as well as several additional, z-transformed, 
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nuisance variables (timecourses from white matter and ventricle ROIs) on a run-by-run basis.  
Following this regression step, we generated condition-specific timecourses by concatenating 12-
volume timecourses (with a 1 s volume acquisition time) corresponding to the post-target delay 
in our design. In order to cancel out the contribution of intrinsic functional connectivity in these 
timecourses, we analyzed the differences between Aware and Unaware connectivity for 
individual subject connectivity matrices. We Fisher z-transformed the Pearson correlated 
matrices, calculated difference matrices (Aware - Unaware) per subject and performed graph 
theoretical analyses on these difference matrices, testing vs. a baseline as in a paired t-test. 
Because our analyses utilize normalized (by null graph) values, a baseline value of 1 would 
indicate the matrix is comprised of random data points. Using a paired t-test vs. 1, we found 
significant modularity (mean = 1.4391; p = .04 x 10-9), participation (mean = .8110; p = 
.000001), and clustering effects (mean = .6951; p = .02 x 10-6). There was no significant 
difference for the average path length (mean = 1.0212; p = .2). While this analysis confirms a 
difference in modularity and participation between conditions that we observed with the PPI 
method, interpretation of graph theory metrics based on a matrix of Pearson correlation 
difference scores is difficult in the context of the present design. Specifically, whereas the gPPI 
analysis examines the topology of connectivity matrices under the conditions of target awareness 
and unawareness, this Pearson correlation method requires the examination of a difference 
matrix to account for the influences of intrinsic connectivity. While some individual connectivity 
strengths may not significantly differ between these conditions, they still contribute to the overall 
topology of the network in conjunction with stronger connectivity differences. When calculating 
difference matrices, we likely lose a substantial contributing factor to graph topology due to the 
subtraction of connectivity strengths. This complicates interpretation of the graph theoretical 
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properties of difference matrices and makes extrapolation of our findings to the properties of 
awareness more difficult. Consequently, the main claims of this paper are based on the gPPI 
connectivity analysis described above. 
 
Head Motion  
 Head motion has been shown to have substantial impacts on estimates of functional 
connectivity (Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012; Van Dijk, Sabuncu, & 
Buckner, 2012). In order to ensure that our analyses were not confounded by a condition-specific 
pattern of head movement, we examined head motion during the 12-second period following 
target presentation. We compared the root-mean-square of movement deviations in six estimated 
motion parameters (Van Dijk et al., 2012). No significant interaction was observed between 
conditions in our main analysis (high-confidence hits and misses) and these estimated movement 
parameters (F(1,5) = .76, p = .58). 
 
Discussion 
 A key finding of the present study is the selective effect of target awareness on a specific 
subset of graph theory metrics associated with inter-modular connectivity: While modularity and 
inter-modular participation indices were affected by the awareness manipulation, there were no 
changes in clustering coefficient and characteristic path length. Interestingly, the latter two 
parameters are used to estimate a network’s small-worldness (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010), i.e., a 
network’s tendency to exhibit both high functional segregation and efficiency. The average path 
length (and the related global efficiency metric) is largely insensitive to multiple, long paths in 
larger networks (Estrada & Hatano, 2008), precisely the pattern of connections that appear to be 
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most affected by awareness based on participation differences observed in our data. Additionally, 
existence of small-worldness is defined by strong local clustering (Humphries & Gurney, 2008) 
that may not be affected by the cross-modular changes seen here with awareness. Awareness of a 
simple percept may not significantly affect small-worldness because both of the measures used 
to compute this network feature are more sensitive to intra-modular local connections, whereas it 
evidently is the inter-modular connections that are preferentially affected by conscious target 
perception. As previous studies have identified broad increases in long-distance oscillatory 
synchrony as a marker of consciousness (Gross et al., 2004; King et al., 2013; E. F. Lau, Phillips, 
& Poeppel, 2008; Melloni et al., 2007; Schröter et al., 2012), it is conceivable that the increase in 
participation and breakdown of modularity that we report are a result of changes in long-distance 
functional synchrony following target awareness. 
 As a whole, the present findings provide strong evidence in support of global theories of 
awareness, in which the conscious perception of a stimulus is associated with whole-brain 
dynamic alterations in functional connectivity. Such results may explain why awareness is a 
unitary phenomenal experience (Seth, Izhikevich, Reeke, & Edelman, 2006), and suggest the 
means by which information at the focus of attention is broadcasted across the cerebral cortex. It 
is noteworthy that the changes associated with awareness observed here are more extensive than 
those reported on the basis of BOLD amplitude changes, which tend to show scattered cortical 
activation foci with awareness (Dehaene et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 2005; Lau & Passingham, 
2006; Marois et al., 2000; 2004; Tse et al., 2005).  Such a BOLD amplitude pattern of fronto-
parietal activity was in fact observed in our own data when comparing Target Aware and 
Unaware conditions (see Figure 7). As such, these results imply – aside from differences in 
sensitivity between BOLD amplitude and functional connectivity approaches – that connectivity 
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differences may reflect latent changes in the functional state of distant brain structures, priming 
them for target-related activation should the task or environmental situation call upon it.  
Importantly, even though our results reveal global summary changes in modularity and 
participation that are not driven by massive connectivity changes in a single network or small 
number of nodes, they do not discount focal or network-level contributions to awareness. 
Instead, we view these global connectivity changes as a complementary aspect of awareness to 
the recruitment of fronto-parietal regions observed in numerous univariate studies of BOLD 
amplitude changes (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Beck et al., 2001; Dehaene et al., 
2001; Haynes et al., 2005; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999; 
Marois et al., 2000; 2004; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Rees et al., 2002; 
Tse et al., 2005). It is only once we are able to integrate the findings obtained at different levels 
of analysis that we will have a comprehensive understanding of the neural basis of awareness.  
Finally, while our findings suggest that changes in a single network do not drive the 
global functional connectivity changes, not all network inter-connectivity is similarly engaged. It 
may very well be, for example, that visual and auditory awareness would reveal a different 
balance in functional weights across the brain’s networks. Nevertheless, while more studies are 
evidently required to account for the differentiable aspects of consciousness (Tononi & Edelman, 
1998), our results reveal a possible mechanism supporting the integrative nature of this mental 
state. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INCREASE IN THE BRAIN’S FUNCTIONAL SMALL-WORLDNESS WITH ATTENTION 
CAPTURE 
 
 The previous chapter considered the case in which consciously perceived information 
was goal relevant. However, salient but task-irrelevant stimuli often enjoy a privileged, 
distracting access to our mental faculties. Generally, novel and salient stimuli in the environment 
powerfully grab attention. The existence of such a stimulus-driven orienting response to 
unexpected events has clearly adaptive behavioral purposes and produces wide-ranging 
responses, both cognitively and physiologically (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963). In particular, the 
onset of novel stimuli in the environment produces numerous physiological changes, including 
sympathetic nervous system activation, increased arousal, pupillary dilation, and galvanic skin 
response (Beatty, 1982; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Tracy et al., 2000). These stimuli also 
mobilize a host of related cognitive processes, including (but not limited to) the orienting of 
attention, evaluative processes, and planning of appropriate behavioral responses (Han & Marois, 
2014; Kahneman, 1973; Sara & Bouret, 2012). Altogether, these processes prepare an individual 
to interact with the attention-grabbing event in accordance with its behavioral meaning and 
value. As such, the cumulative response to unexpected or sudden events in the environment can 
be considered a global one, recruiting aspects of both body and mind.  
 In contrast to the global effects resulting from the capture of attention by a surprise 
stimulus, neurobiological studies of attention have mostly focused on its selective neural 
properties (Chawla, Rees, & Friston, 1999; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 
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1995; Kastner et al., 1999; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004; Reynolds, Chelazzi, & Desimone, 1999). 
However, even such focal effects can trigger a cascade of neurophysiological changes that 
propagate across brain regions, for example via oscillatory mechanisms (Fries, Reynolds, Rorie, 
& Desimone, 2001; Womelsdorf, Fries, Mitra, & Desimone, 2005). Indeed, widespread changes 
in neurophysiological activity are an integral part of an influential model of attention – the biased 
competition model – in which it is postulated that attention biases the competition for 
representation of stimuli or events in the brain (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Yet, evidence that 
attention produces truly global neural changes is scant. Attention networks of the brain have 
been well delineated, including a ventrolateral network composed of the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), inferior frontal junction (IFJ) and anterior insula (AI)(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Downar et al., 2000; Marois et al., 2000; Serences et al., 2005) that overlaps with a related 
‘salience’ network in AI and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) (V. Menon, 2011; V. 
Menon & Uddin, 2010), as well as a dorsal attention network consisting of core components in 
the frontal eye field and dorsal parietal cortex (Beck et al., 2001; Chica, Valero-Cabre, Paz-
Alonso, & Bartolomeo, 2014; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kastner et al., 1999; G. L. Shulman et 
al., 1999). These studies, as well as many others, have ultimately produced a network-level view 
of attention, in which the control of attention results from the coordinated function of a 
circumscribed set of brain areas. However, as noted above, numerous physiological and 
cognitive processes take place following the capture of attention by an unexpected event in order 
to bring about the swift and systemic changes that are necessary to insure a prompt analysis, 
physiological reaction, and behavioral response to the event (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963). 
Given the wide-ranging extent of these changes, they may likely originate from well beyond the 
confines of the attention networks. Moreover, the rapidity and flexibility at which an individual 
	 48	
may have to interact with the surprising event could be optimized if cortical resources are primed 
to address this event. Thus, we hypothesize that attention capture by a surprising event involves 
widespread alterations in the functional topology of the human brain to facilitate the rapid 
exchange of information across the cerebral cortex.   
 Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) combined with graph theoretical 
analyses, we sought to examine whether detection of salient, novel, task-irrelevant “oddball” 
events produced functional connectivity changes throughout the brain or whether they were 
mostly confined to the attention/salience networks. Graph theory is ideal for testing global 
functional connectivity predictions as it provides concise measures of the functional topology of 
an entire system (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). Participants performed a demanding goal-oriented 
visual search task in which they monitored a rapid stream of distractors for the presentation of 
target letters, with the task disrupted by the rare presentations of unexpected, salient oddball 
images. Such oddballs powerfully capture attention and produce a strong orienting response 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, & Marois, 2010b; 
Braver et al., 2001; Marois et al., 2000; M. Stevens et al., 2005) that quickly habituates after the 
first few oddball instances (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Asplund, Todd, Snyder, 
Gilbert, & Marois, 2010b; Sokolov, 1963). The rapid habituation of the orienting response makes 
a specific prediction about the life span of the changes in functional connectivity that may 
accompany attention capture. Specifically, repeated ‘oddball’ presentations should attenuate the 
changes in the brain’s functional topology brought about by the initial presentations, despite the 
continued presence of these task-irrelevant events. Consequently, we aim to examine two factors 
of the functional topology following oddball presentation: (1) whether the initial presentations of 
oddballs produce a global shift in the pattern of functional connectivity rather than network-level 
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(e.g. attention network) changes and (2) whether such global changes mirror the behavioral 
habituation pattern that is observed with repeated presentations of the surprising events.  
 
Methods 
 
This study presents novel connectivity and graph theory analyses of data acquired in 
Asplund et al. (2010b). The graph analytical methods have been previously described in detail in 
Godwin et al. (2015) and in Chapter II of this dissertation.  
 
Participants 
 Thirty-one individuals (12 females) recruited from the Vanderbilt University community 
participated in the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The 
Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board approved the experimental protocol, and 
informed consent was obtained from all subjects. Data from one participant was excluded due to 
technical problems during the scan session. 
 
Behavioral Paradigm 
 The main task (Fig. 9) consisted of searching for a target letter (‘X’) presented in a rapid 
serial visual presentation (RSVP) of distractor letters (all letters were shown in white Helvetica 
font, 1.8° x 1.8°, overlaid on a dark gray background). Trials were 5.4s seconds long and 
consisted of a 3.4 s letter RSVP followed by a 2 s response period and a 2.6 s inter-trial-interval 
(ITI). RSVP periods consisted of 31 letters chosen randomly, without possibility of two identical 
letters occurring in a row, from a possible set of 20 with vowels being excluded from the 
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possible set. All stimuli were shown for 100 ms with a 10 ms inter-stimulus-interval (ISI). An 
onscreen prompt directed participants to initiate a right index finger button press response to 
indicate “target present” or a right middle finger response to indicate ‘target absent.’ ITIs 
displayed a white fixation cross on the screen for the duration. The target was present on 77.5% 
of the 40 total trials presented over the course of one fMRI run per participant.  
 
 
Figure 9. (a) Schematic of behavioral design.  Each trial (8 s) began with a 3.4 s RSVP of 31 
letters, with each letter presented for 100 ms with a 10 ms inter-stimulus-interval. Participants 
had 2 s to respond following each trial as to the presence of a target, indicated by a prompt on 
screen. A 2.6 s inter-trial-interval followed each response period while a white fixation cross 
remained on the screen. Size of stimuli shown in figure are not to scale. (b) Rates of target 
detection for Early (first two) oddball trials, late (last four) oddball trials and no-oddball trials. 
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On a subset of trials (6 out of 40) participants were shown a salient, task-irrelevant 
‘oddball’ during the RSVP at fixation in place of a distractor letter stimulus. Oddballs consisted 
of grayscale faces, each distinct from one another, and were shown during both target-present 
trials (5) and no-target trials (1). On target-present trials, oddball images were displayed 330 ms 
prior to the target. Although only faces were used in the current study, we have previously shown 
that similar behavioral effects are obtained for other oddball types (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & 
Marois, 2010a). The order of oddball trials, including the target-less oddball trial, was pseudo-
randomized and was balanced across subjects. Oddball trials were separated by a minimum of 
two trials containing a target with no oddball stimulus. Only target-present trials were practiced 
prior to the fMRI session and participants needed to be proficient at 80% accuracy prior to 
scanning.  
All stimuli were presented using Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) in MATLAB (MathWorks).  
 
fMRI Methods 
 The study was carried out in a 3T GE MRI system at the Vanderbilt University Institute 
of Imaging Sciences (VUIIS). Stimuli were back-projected from an LCD projector (Avotec, Inc.) 
onto a screen viewed by the participant lying in the scanner via a mirror. Nineteen 7-mm-thick 
axial slices were taken parallel to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure (AC-PC) line 
(0 mm skip; 3.75 × 3.75 mm in-plane). T2*-weighted image acquisition consisted of a 25 ms 
echo time, 70° flip angle, 240 mm FOV, 64 × 64 matrix, and a 2,000 ms repetition time. 166 
brain volumes were collected during the functional scan, although the first 6 volumes were 
discarded to allow for signal stabilization.  
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 Data preprocessing was performed using Brain Voyager QX 2.6 (Brain Innovation) and 
included 3D head-motion correction, linear trend removal, and a correction for slice acquisition 
timing. Functional and anatomical runs were co-registered and transformed into standard 
Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). Prior to the functional connectivity stage of 
analysis, six estimates of motion and the first derivatives of those estimates were regressed out of 
the data to account for the potential effects of head motion on connectivity estimates (Power et 
al., 2012). 
 
Functional Connectivity Analysis 
 Regions of interest were defined according to the results of a previously reported analysis 
of resting state functional connectivity (Power et al., 2011), in which authors identified 264 
nodes with strong overlap with known functional-network systems. Conversion of these 
MNIcoordinates into Talairach coordinate space was performed in the current study via the 
mni2tal.m function. Six-millimeter radius spheres were drawn around each coordinate to create a 
list of 264 ROIs to serve as nodes for graph theoretical analyses. 
 To assess how connectivity differed as a function of task, connections between nodes 
were measured using the generalized psychophysiological interaction (gPPI) method (McLaren 
et al., 2012). In using gPPI, connections are estimated based on correlations in blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) signal in such a way as to separately estimate task activation effects and 
non-task specific correlations in order to isolate task-dependent changes in connectivity (Cisler et 
al., 2014; Gitelman et al., 2003; Kim & Horwitz, 2008). Three general classes of predictors are 
included in the general linear model (GLM) to simultaneously account for respective sources of 
variance: predictors of task activation, a seed node timecourse, and condition-specific interaction 
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timecourses. Predictors of task activation are analogous to those used in standard fMRI GLMs. 
Interaction regressors predict changes in connectivity isolated to periods following the 
presentation of the respective stimuli while zeroing out predictions at other timepoints. The 
parameter estimates corresponding to the interaction predictors serve as our task-modulated 
measurement of functional connectivity.  
 In order to produce a full connectivity matrix, a separate GLM was performed for each of 
the 264 seeds (nodal ROIs). For each GLM, a timecourse was extracted from a seed region, 
included as a predictor in the GLM, and utilized to produce a seed-specific interaction regressor 
with task condition. Increases in the interaction (PPI) parameter estimates for a particular voxel 
in a given GLM indicates an increase in the synchrony of the seed timecourse and the target 
voxel specific to the particular task condition. We assumed no directionality in these predictors 
and, consequently, averaged across the diagonal in our per-subject connectivity matrices, thus 
producing a symmetric graph (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). 
 GLMs included condition-specific regressors for the first two oddball trials (“Early” 
oddballs), the next four oddball trials (“Late” oddballs), target-only trials, and no-target trials. 
The decision to distinguish the initial two oddballs from the later four was based on the pattern 
of behavioral results indicating an exponential decrement in oddballs’ capacity to capture 
attention with repeated presentations, with the first two presentations capturing more attention 
than the next four, as judged by target detection performance (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 
2010a; Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, & Marois, 2010b). In addition to the two oddball 
conditions (Early and Late oddballs), parameter estimates for interaction regressors to be input 
into the graph theoretical analyses were also obtained for the Search trials condition, as no-target 
trials provide a baseline for assessing connectivity and topology in the absence of distracting 
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oddball images. Based on the comparison of target detection in the Late oddballs vs. Search trials 
(see Fig. 9), the Late oddballs still capture attention (see Results for a comparison of Early and 
Late oddball topologies against all oddball-absent trials). gPPI analyses were conducted using 
custom scripts in the BrainVoyager QX 2.6 and MATLAB environments. 
   
Graph Theoretical Analysis 
 Graphs were constructed for each of our conditions of interest (Early oddballs, Late 
oddballs, and Search trials) and examined via the Brain Connectivity Toolbox (Rubinov & 
Sporns, 2010) for graph theoretical analyses. However, several initial steps were performed prior 
to the calculation of graph theoretic statistics. In particular, one must account for the effects of 
graph metrics due to the number of nodes, connections, and distribution of connections in a 
graph (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). First, graphs were proportionally thresholded (to exclude the 
potential influence of noise connections on graph metrics) in a range from the top 5% strongest 
connections to 25% strongest connections at 5% intervals, similar to previously reported work 
(Cao et al., 2014; Dosenbach et al., 2007; Godwin et al., 2015; Rubinov et al., 2009). We present 
the results for top 10% of connections here, as well as validation with alternate thresholds. 
Following thresholding, matrices were rescaled to the range [0,1] by dividing connectivity values 
by the maximum value on a per-subject graph basis. Finally, following calculation of graph 
metrics, all values were “normalized” by comparing said values to those derived from the 
average of 100 null reference graphs. Reference graphs were constructed by utilizing the Brain 
Connectivity Toolbox function “randmio_und.” This normalization step allows for the 
comparison of graphs across thresholds, which contain variable connection densities and can 
affect values of graph metrics (van Wijk et al., 2010). 
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 Corrections for multiple comparisons of graph metrics was performed by gating 
comparison of pairwise conditions by the significant result of an omnibus one-way ANOVA per 
metric examined (Rubinov & Sporns, 2011). Given the non-independence of the network 
properties examined, no correction for multiple comparisons was performed based on the 
number of metrics tested, similar to previous work in the field (Cao et al., 2014; Godwin et al., 
2015; Rubinov & Sporns, 2010; 2011). Additionally, the current study aims to assess globally 
averaged measures of topology, as opposed to testing the significance of individual nodes, 
negating the need for corrections for multiple comparisons based on the number of nodes 
(Bassett et al., 2011; Lynall et al., 2010; Schröter et al., 2012) or significance per voxel as a 
thresholding measure (Bassett et al., 2009; E. T. Bullmore & Bassett, 2011; Cole et al., 2014; 
Dosenbach et al., 2007; Rubinov & Sporns, 2011). 
 To get a more complete understanding of the connectivity changes associated with 
attention capture, we tested metrics of functional segregation, functional integration, and 
centrality of the graph system to test the “integration” and “small-worldness” hypotheses 
(Godwin et al., 2015; Rubinov & Sporns, 2010).  
The integration hypothesis predicts changes in modularity and participation coefficient as 
a function of target awareness (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). We utilize Newman’s spectral 
algorithm for weighted matrices to determine the modularity of graphs, a measure assessing the 
degree to which connections can be segregated into non-overlapping “modules” with a maximal 
amount of within-module connections while minimizing between module connections. Weighted 
modularity (Qw) was calculated by: 
 
𝑄! =  1𝑙! 𝑤!,!  −  𝑘!!𝑘!!𝑙! 𝜕!!,!!!,!∈!  
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with weighted connections between nodes i and j (wi,j), sum of all weights in a graph (lw), 
weighted degree of a node (ki), module containing node i (mi), and 𝜕!!,!! = 1 if mi = mj. The 
degree to which modularity increases reflects the extent of isolated processing within modules, 
independent of communication with nodes in other modules, and hence the segregation of these 
islands of information processing.  
 Utilizing the modules defined by the modularity algorithm, we can calculate the degree to 
which nodes communicate across modules; i.e. the participation coefficient (𝑦!!) of those nodes, 
a measure of centrality of the graph’s system. Nodes with high participation increase global 
integration by facilitating between-module communications. Specifically, 
 
𝑦!! = 1 −  𝑘!! 𝑚𝑘!! !!∈!  
 
where kiw(m) is the weighted degree of connections between node i and nodes in module m. 
The “small-worldness” hypothesis predicts changes in the balance between the demands 
for functional integration necessary for efficient global communication and functional 
segregation necessary for specialized processing (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Watts & Strogatz, 
1998), potentially uniquely occurring in the clustering coefficient and characteristic path length.  
The clustering coefficient highlights the degree to which information is shared across 
triads of nodes, reflecting local sites of dense interconnection. The clustering coefficient (Cw), 
where ti is the number of triangles around node I, is calculated with the following formula:  
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𝐶!  =  1𝑛 2𝑡!!𝑘! 𝑘! − 1!∈!  
  
 The characteristic path length, a metric of functional integration reflecting the degree to 
which information is spread widely throughout the graph, measures the functional distance 
between any two nodes. Specifically, the characteristic path length (Lw) is defined the functional 
distance between nodes, where di,j  is the shortest path length between nodes i and j, computed 
with a inverse mapping of weight to length.  
 
𝐿!  =  1𝑛 𝑑!"!!∈!,!!!𝑛 − 1!∈!  
 
Finally, Small-Worldness (Sw) can be calculated by the ratio of the normalized (by null 
network) clustering coefficient to the average path length: 
 
𝑆! =  𝐶!𝐶!"#$ 𝐿!𝐿!"#$ 
 
where Crand and Lrand are clustering and average path length calculated on comparable 
random networks (Humphries & Gurney, 2008). 
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Results 
 
 Target detection in the fMRI run was worse in the first two oddball trials than in the last 
four (t(29) = 6.036, p < .001; Fig. 9b ). Importantly, target detection in the last four oddball trials 
was also worse than in target-only trials (t(29) = 56.064, p < .001). Thus, although attenuated, 
attention capture still took place in the last four oddballs. Taken together, these behavioral results 
indicate that oddballs powerfully capture attention, and that the strength of this attention capture 
is contingent on the number of times oddball are presented.  
 The rapid attenuation of attention capture with serial oddball presentations provides a 
powerful means to assess whether potential global connectivity changes reflect attention capture 
per se rather than the physical presentation of the oddballs, as the latter is equated in all oddball 
trials. Indeed, based on the behavioral results, one would expect a temporal order effect of 
oddball presentations onto global brain connectivity, with largest effects with the first two 
presentations, followed by the next four oddball presentations, which is in turn followed by trials 
consisting of only goal-driven processes (Search trials).   
 To examine the effects of attention capture on global functional connectivity patterns, we 
assessed the pair-wise functional connectivity across 264 nodal regions of interest of the cerebral 
cortex (Power et al., 2011) via the generalized psychophysiological interaction (PPI) method 
(McLaren et al., 2012). From the pair-wise functional connections across these 264 nodes, we 
assessed summary properties of this ensemble functional cortical network (i.e. the graph) using 
graph theoretical metrics based on the top 10% strongest functional connections. Given the 
extensive behavioral effects produced by the initial presentations of salient, task-irrelevant 
stimuli, we hypothesized that these would be accompanied with pervasive changes in functional 
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connectivity, reflecting the powerful capture of attention by the unexpected oddballs. We further 
predicted that such putative global connectivity changes would be attenuated with additional 
oddball presentations, though these changes would still be present relative to trials with no 
oddball presentations. Consistent with this hypothesis, a node-based search for such pattern of 
functional connectivity changes revealed a widespread distribution of progressively decreasing 
connectivity strengths with the three conditions of interest, namely the first two (Early) oddballs, 
last four (Late) oddballs, and No oddballs (Search trials; Fig. 10) with no discernable structure in 
the topological arrangement of these changes.  
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Figure 10. Subject-averaged connectivity for edges showing connectivity strength changes 
consistent with the behavioral pattern of Early oddball > Late oddball > Search trials, with hotter 
colored edges denoting increased magnitude of interaction regressor (seed x condition; PPI) 
parameter estimates. Heat scale indicates magnitude of interaction regressor (seed x condition; 
PPI) parameter estimates after rescaling to the range [0,1], as was performed for graph 
theoretical analyses. Node coordinates and network memberships were derived from Power et al. 
(2011), with nodes color-coded according to purported network membership. Node alignment 
with inflated surface is approximate and displayed for illustration purposes only. Abbreviations: 
C/O – Cingulo-opercular; F/P – Fronto-parietal. 
 
 
 It is difficult, however, to draw any further conclusions from the visual inspection of the 
changes in connectivity patterns rendered into two dimensions. To provide a quantitative and 
global assessment of the changes in functional connectivity patterns that occur with attention 
capture by oddballs, we submitted the PPI matrices data to graph theory analysis. Specifically, 
using graph theory metrics of functional segregation, integration, and centrality, we tested two 
competing models by which attention capture may affect the brain’s global functional topology, 
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namely via changes in “integration” versus “small-worldness.”  According to the integration 
model, suggested by a recent study about the global connectivity changes that take place with 
conscious target detection (Godwin et al., 2015), attention capture would lead to a breakdown of 
the brain’s functional modularity (i.e. the ability to separate the graph into non-overlapping 
modules or networks), with such breakdown resulting from an increase in the functional 
participation of inter-modular connections. Alternatively, the small-worldness model instead 
argues that attention capture by oddball presentations would trigger an increase in the brain’s 
functional small-worldness, a composite measure of the balance between functional 
specialization and efficient information propagation in the brain (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; 
Watts & Strogatz, 1998). According to this model, the capture of attention by the presentation of 
oddballs would lead to oddball information being more efficiently processed locally and 
distributed globally. For both of these hypotheses, the predicted graph theoretical effects of 
oddball presentations would be greatest with Early oddballs, with diminished effects for Late 
oddballs and even lesser effects during Search trials. 
  The graph theoretical properties of Early oddball presentations, Late oddball 
presentations, as well as Search trials for the top 10% of functional connections are depicted in 
Figure 11. To address the first proposed account of global functional connectivity change – 
integration, or decreased modularity caused by an increase in participation coefficient – we 
looked for main effects of condition in modularity and participation coefficient.  Functional 
modularity did show a main effect of condition (F(2,29) = 5.324, p = .008), but it was counter to 
the pattern predicted in the integration hypothesis; modularity was higher in Early oddball trials 
than in Late oddball trials (t(29) = 2.249, p = .032) and than in Search trials (t(29) = 2.98, p = .006). 
No significant difference was observed between late oddball trials and search trials (t(29) = .825, p 
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= .416).  The greater modularity for the Early oddball condition suggests that functional modules 
were more easily segregated in the first few oddball presentations than in other trial types. The 
participation coefficient, which measures cross-modular connections defined by the modularity 
algorithm, showed no significant main effect of condition (F(2,29) = 2.102, p = .131). Taken 
together, these results suggest that the capture of attention by the presentations of novel, salient 
oddballs does not break down the brain’s network modularity; if anything, these oddballs 
increase it. Rather than causing global increases in functional integration, the initial oddball 
presentations – when the behavioral capture effect is most pronounced – displayed significantly 
more segregation compared to Search trials. 
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Figure 11. Effect of oddball manipulation on selected graph theoretic measures for Early oddball, 
Late oddball, and search events. All y-axis values represent the ratio of the observed graph 
theory metric to the corresponding random graph metrics (see Methods). Asterisks indicate 
significant main effects of condition at p < .05. Error bars represent within-group standard error. 
 
 To address the second proposed account of global changes in functional connectivity with 
attention capture, we first assessed the metrics that are factored in the computation of small-
worldness: the clustering coefficient and characteristic path length.  The clustering coefficient 
showed a main effect of condition (F(2,29) = 7.91, p < .001), with higher clustering coefficient in 
Early and Late oddballs than in Search trials (t(29) = 3.599, p = .001 and t(29) =2.742, p = .01, 
respectively), and a non-significant trend between the Early and Late oddball trials (t(29) = 1.471, 
p = .152). For characteristic path length, there were no main effect of condition (F(2,29) = .547, p 
= .566). Small-worldness, measured as the ratio of the normalized clustering coefficient over the 
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normalized characteristic path length (Humphries & Gurney, 2008; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), 
showed a main effect of condition (F(2,29) = 7.539, p = .001). Specifically, small-worldness was 
higher during Early and Late oddball presentations than during Search trials (t(29) = 3.521, p = 
.001; t(29) = 2.531, p = .017), with a non-significant trend between Early and Late oddball 
conditions (t(29) = 1.537, p = .135).  
The estimates of small-worldness for Early oddball trials, Late oddball trials and Search 
trials tended to match the behavioral data pattern (i,e. Oddballearly > Oddballlate > Search). In 
order to quantify the amount of evidence for this pattern in the graph theory data, we adopted a 
Bayesian inequality constrained analysis of variance (Klugkist, Laudy, & Hoijtink, 2005; Mulder 
et al., 2009). Specifically, we assessed how much more evidence there is for the constrained 
inequality hypothesis (Oddballearly > Oddballlate > Search; hereafter Hoddball) than for the 
alternative hypothesis that there is no effect of condition (i.e. Oddballearly = Oddballlate = Search; 
hereafter Hnull). This method of comparison using constrained hypotheses generates allows for 
comparison across multiple constrained hypotheses by computing a Bayes factor relative to a 
common, unconstrained null. We found that small-worldness showed substantially more 
evidence (Bayes factor = 5.45) for the hypothesis Hoddball, compared to the hypothesis Hnull 
(Bayes factor = 0.88). There was also more evidence for Hoddball than for the alternative 
hypothesis that Oddballearly =  Oddballlate > Search (Bayes factor = 2.97).  
 It is conceivable that the small-worldness results were caused by large changes in a 
restricted set of nodes in the overall graph – such as those corresponding to attention networks 
associated with the orienting of attention to unexpected stimuli – instead of emanating from 
changes distributed throughout the cerebral cortex. To address this issue, we examined the graph 
metrics of small-worldness and clustering coefficient per network rather than for the entire 
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graph. If one or a few networks dominate changes in clustering or small-worldness with 
condition, there should be an interaction between network and condition to the graph theory 
metrics. As shown in Figure 12, however, there were no interactions between network and 
condition for either clustering (F(26,754) = .918, p = .583) or small-worldness (F(26,754) = .978, p = 
.496); all networks appear to show the same trend observed in the global results, with mean 
clustering coefficients and small-worldness greatest for Early oddballs and smallest for the 
Search trials. Thus, it does not appear that network-specific modulations in graph metrics drive 
the overall global results in clustering coefficient or small-worldness.  
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Figure 12. Effect of oddball manipulation on graph theoretic measures of clustering coefficient 
and small-worldness averaged across Power et al. (2011) modules. No interaction between 
network and condition was observed for any of the examined metrics. Error bars represent 
within-group standard error. 
 
 
 Another, and more direct, means to assess whether the global results of small-worldness 
may be driven by the attention networks is to employ a targeted attack procedure (Bullmore & 
Sporns, 2009), which consists in assessing the impact of excluding the ventral and dorsal 
attention networks, respectively, from the graph theory analysis. If excluding these nodes from 
the graph lead to significant changes in small-worldness (and clustering coefficient), then one 
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can conclude that the attention networks are critical to the global changes in small-worldness 
with oddball presentations. Aside from excluding these nodes and the edges they formed with 
other portions of the overall graph, the analytical approach was identical to that of the globally 
averaged analysis described above. When excluding the ventral attention network, main effects 
of condition for the top 10% of connections were still observed for clustering coefficient (F(2,29) 
= 7.51, p = .001) and small-worldness (F(2,29) = 7.178, p = .002), with similar pair-wise 
differences as observed with the entire graph. Similarly, targeted attack of the dorsal attention 
network yielded significant effects of condition for clustering (F(2,29) = 6.109, p = .004) and small 
worldness (F(2,29) = 5.809, p = .005), with similar pair-wise differences as observed with the 
entire graph. Thus, the results of the targeted attacks of the ventral and dorsal attention networks 
mirror those obtained with the entire graph. These findings suggest that the global changes in 
functional connectivity with the presentations of novel, salient oddballs do not uniquely occur in 
attention networks. This is not to say, however, that the attention networks do not play critical 
roles in the responses to attention-capturing events (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a). 
Rather, our findings suggest that distinct from BOLD amplitude-based changes in these 
attentional networks, there is also a more diffuse, global set of changes that accompany detection 
of task irrelevant, oddballs. 
 
Head motion 
 Head motion has been shown to have significant effects on functional connectivity and 
graph theoretical measures (Drakesmith et al., 2015; Power et al., 2011; Van Dijk et al., 2012). 
We compared the root mean square of movement deviations in six estimated motion parameters 
(Van Dijk et al., 2012) to ensure that our analyses were not confounded by a condition-specific 
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pattern of head movement. No significant interaction was observed between conditions in our 
main analysis (early oddballs, late oddballs, and search trials) and these estimated movement 
parameters (F(2, 5) = 1.48, p = 0.147), suggesting that our principal graph theoretical results are 
not differentially affected by head motion. 
 
No-oddball trials 
 Early and late oddballs were compared against trials with no oddball or target presented 
in order to compare the stimulus-driven capture effects of the oddball vs. an uninterrupted goal-
driven state. However, in order to determine whether the inclusion of target-present trials would 
change the pattern of results observed, we recomputed PPI values and re-ran the globally 
averaged analyses to compare early oddballs, late oddballs, and all non-oddball trials (both 
target-present and target-absent).  
 Using this comparison, modularity no longer displayed a main effect of condition (F(2,29) 
= 1.574, p = .216). However, the clustering coefficient (F(2,29) = 6.029, p = .004) and small-
worldness (F(2,29) = 5.422, p = .007) showed similar main effects of condition as observed in the 
main analysis. The participation coefficient (F(2,29) = 1.393, p = .257) and characteristic path 
length (F(2,29) = .303, p = .740) all showed no effect of condition, similar to the main analysis.  
As for pairwise comparisons, the clustering coefficient showed significant differences 
between early oddball trials and search trials (t(29) = 3.055, p = .005) as well as between early and 
no-oddball trials (t(29) = 2.393, p = .023), with no significant differences between early and late 
oddball clustering (t(29) = 1.208, p = .237). Small-worldness showed significant differences 
between early oddball and no-oddball trials (t(29) = 2.921, p = .007) as well as late oddball and 
no-oddball trials (t(29) = 2.345, p = .026), with no significant difference between early and late 
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oddballs (t(29) = 1.025, p = .314). These results largely mirror the pairwise differences observed 
in the main analysis, supporting our conclusions that measures of segregation differ amongst 
conditions as a result of the detection of oddball stimuli. 
 
Thresholding 
 Thresholding of graphs ultimately serves to exclude noise connections from consideration 
when calculating summary graph theoretical measures; even a small number of noise 
connections can have drastic effects on descriptions of graphs (Drakesmith et al., 2015). 
However, various graph measures are sensitive to the number of nodes and edges included in this 
calculation; consequently, analyzing only a single threshold places a constraint on the 
interpretability of the metrics (van Wijk et al., 2010). To consider the possibility that our results 
might be unique to a particular graph threshold, we repeated our globally averaged analyses at 
several additional thresholds ranging from the top 5% of connections to 25%, at 5% intervals. 
The results of these analyses are depicted in Figure 13. To test whether our results were unique 
to the 10% threshold described in the main analysis, threshold was included as an additional 
factor in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). We examined several aspects of the results 
at these additional thresholds. First, do we replicate the main effects of condition? Next, is there 
an interaction between condition and threshold for our metrics? If an interaction exists, does this 
interaction conflict with our originally presented pattern of results?  
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Figure 13. Graph metrics calculated across the range of the top 5% of connections to 25% of 
connections, at 5% increments. The effects of condition on modularity, participation, clustering, 
characteristic path length, and small-worldness are generally consistent across thresholds. 
 
 
 Modularity (F(2,58) = 7.083, p = .004), clustering coefficient (F(2,58) = 6.408, p = .003), and 
small worldness (F(2,58) = 8.313, p = .002) all showed main effects of condition, similar to the 
results observed in the main analysis when only considering our a priori threshold of 10%. Some 
of these measures did show an interaction of condition and threshold, namely modularity (F(8,232) 
= 3.414, p < .001), and small-worldness (F(8,232) = 2.385, p = .022). However, as Figure 13 
depicts, these metrics never appear to show a qualitatively different pattern of results across 
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thresholds. We conclude from these results that our findings are generally robust across the range 
of thresholds tested.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The results of the present study indicate that detection of task-irrelevant oddball images 
produces specific changes in global functional connectivity as assessed by graph theory. In 
particular, oddballs produced global changes in measures of functional segregation – namely 
modularity and clustering coefficient – as well as in small-worldness. The network and targeted 
attack analyses suggest that these changes were not specific to a subset of nodes or networks, but 
rather reflected truly global changes.  
One of the two tested hypotheses, the “integration” account, predicted that the capture of 
attention by novel, task-irrelevant oddballs would cause increases in measures of global 
functional integration. The present results are inconsistent with this hypothesis. Indeed, rather 
than finding clear changes in integration metrics, we observed changes in measures that typically 
reflect properties of localized connectivity, with these effects culminating in significant changes 
in the brain’s small-worldness, in direct support of the second hypothesis of global functional 
connectivity change with the capture of attention. 
 Small-world networks are often described as representing an efficient balance of 
functionally specialized and densely interconnected sub-networks with robust long-distance 
integration across these more specialized sub-components (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; Rubinov 
& Sporns, 2010; Tononi et al., 1994; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). A wide variety of physical, 
technological, and social networks produce organizations that fall into this class of networks, a 
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ubiquity that suggests these networks likely provide a unique efficiency in global information 
transfer – owing to a low average path length – without sacrificing the ability to perform more 
specialized processes by densely interconnected subcomponents with high clustering (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998). Our results show that the changes associated with presentation of a task-
irrelevant oddball specifically correlate with increases in clustering, a key component of small-
worldness. It is possible that this increase in clustering reflects the panoply of specialized 
processes that are recruited with the capture of attention by a novel event (Pavlov, 1927; 
Sokolov, 1963), including primary sensory systems, executive control processes, and ultimately 
motor systems. According to this view, the increase in clustering coefficient is a result of 
widespread priming of functional neural connectivity in preparation for further processing of the 
oddball event, should it be advantageous for any given neural node or network to be involved in 
the swift processing of that event. Such large-scale increase in functional clustering may be 
brought about by activation of the locus coeruleus, as this region of the brainstem is known to 
briskly respond to novel events and to have widespread neuromodulatory effects in the cerebral 
cortex to facilitate rapid reorganizations of distributed functional networks (Sara & Bouret, 
2012).  
 While we hypothesized that the capture of attention by a novel, salient event would 
trigger a surge in the brain’s functional small-worldness, we did not expect that this change 
would be brought about by an increase in local functional connectivity rather than, or in addition 
to, a decrease in path length. A lack of effect on path length may be due to functional networks 
already being very efficient with near-optimal short-path lengths (Latora & Marchiori, 2001; van 
den Heuvel, Stam, Boersma, & Pol, 2008). Consistent with the present findings, a 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) study of the presentations of rare, deviant tones among 
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standard tones reported that the deviant tones produced an increase in the clustering coefficient 
and other measures of localized processing (Nicol et al., 2012) rather than global increases in 
functional integration. What we show here is the profound functional implication that a change 
in clustering coefficient with the powerful capture of attention by oddballs can have on the 
brain’s functional topology, and that is to increase its small-worldness, a fundamental and 
ubiquitous characteristic of efficient neural networks (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; Humphries & 
Gurney, 2008; Watts & Strogatz, 1998).    
 An intriguing outcome of the present findings is how much they contrast with those 
obtained in Chapter II, in which conscious target perception was associated with large-scale 
increases in measures of functional integration and long-distance connectivity, consistent with 
global network models of awareness (Baars, 2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Ekman et al., 
2012). Here we show that the powerful capture of attention by novel, task-irrelevant oddball 
stimuli produces changes in local connectivity patterns across the whole brain, similar to the 
profound and reliable pattern of effects observed in previous studies of capture by oddball 
stimuli (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Braver et al., 2001; Marois et al., 2000; M. 
Stevens et al., 2005).  
  One possibility to account for these marked differences in functional dynamic topology 
may be the goal relevance of the attended or consciously perceived information. Greater long-
range functional efficiency and functional integration has been shown to correlate with improved 
performance in goal-oriented working memory (Bassett et al., 2009; Kitzbichler et al., 2011) and 
visual discrimination tasks (Ekman et al., 2012). By contrast, the stimuli examined in the current 
study as well as in Nicol et al. (2011) can be considered distractors in the context of an ongoing 
goal-relevant task (though only the present data showed these distractors to interrupt ongoing 
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goal-oriented behavior). It is therefore possible that functional integration is critical for the 
successful completion of task goals, whereas increased functional segregation emerges with the 
presentation of distractors that interrupt ongoing processing and capture attention from the goal-
directed task sets. Functional integration and segregation may thus play specific and 
countervailing roles when it comes to processing of task-relevant and -irrelevant information. 
Alternatively, is also conceivable that rather than task relevance, it is the cognitive state that 
accounts for the differences in findings between Chapters II and III. That is, to the extent that 
attention and awareness can be dissociated (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003), it is 
possible that these two states are associated with distinct functional topologies. Given the 
significance that support for either of these two hypotheses would have in regards to 
understanding global brain functions, they merit further investigation.  
 In conclusion, the present findings indicate that attention capture by a novel, task-
irrelevant event triggers a shift in the brain’s small-world topology. Despite these changes 
occurring among local connectivity measures, they were observed across the entire graph system. 
It is perhaps through widespread increases in local connectivity that the brain is able to mobilize 
a wide variety of physiological and cognitive processes with attentional capture, thereby 
rendering the brain’s functional topology a smaller world for swiftly and adaptively analyzing 
and responding to the attention capturing event.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
GLOBAL NETWORK PROPERTIES OF GOAL-RELEVANT AND -IRRELEVANT 
COMPETITION 
 
 Chapters II and III of this dissertation aimed to characterize awareness of percepts 
characterized as being respectively relevant (targets) and irrelevant (oddballs) for the ongoing 
cognitive tasks. Two qualitatively different patterns of global connectivity change correlated 
with each of these stimuli types. In everyday life we are constantly bombarded by stimuli, only a 
fraction of which will be relevant to our ongoing behavior. However, all of these stimuli, both 
relevant and irrelevant, will compete for representation and higher-level processing in the brain. 
When searching for a target among distractors that share target features, the amount of time it 
takes to find the target increases with the number of distractors (Neisser & Lazar, 1964; Wolfe, 
2003) as well as with distractor similarity to the target (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). When 
distractors are visually salient, they will attract attention away from goal-directed processes in a 
stimulus driven manner (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Theeuwes, Kramer, & Kingstone, 
2004; Yantis & Egeth, 1999). Additionally, when distractors share some stimulus feature(s) with 
targets, they will tend to capture attention via a hybrid of bottom-up and goal-driven processed 
referred to as contingent capture (Folk & Remington, 1992).  
 Both targets and nontargets are thought to contribute to a competition between stimuli 
fighting for access to the brain’s information processing pathways. The biased competition 
model of selective attention (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997) 
asserts that the processing of both goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant stimuli will be influenced by 
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bottom-up and top-down biasing factor. These biases preferentially advantage each stimulus type 
to ultimately win this competition so that potentially relevant information reaches awareness. 
Competition appears to arise as multiple sources of information interact at common neural 
representations to mutually suppress one another (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Kelley & Lavie, 2011; 
Reynolds et al., 1999).  
  The sources of these biasing signals have often been linked to two separable cortical 
networks that control goal-driven and stimulus-driven orienting (Chiu & Yantis, 2009; Corbetta, 
1998; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). The goal-driven control of attention is localized to a dorsal 
attention work, comprised of bilateral human frontal eye fields (FEF) and intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastner et al., 1999). Stimulus-
driven attention, recruited by salient or novel items in the environment, has been localized to the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and inferior frontal junction (IFJ) (Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Marois et al., 2000) and is closely tied to a related network composed of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula (AI) tasked with indicating salience of 
objects in the environment(Han & Marois, 2014; V. Menon, 2011; V. Menon & Uddin, 2010). 
 The previous two chapters have described connectivity patterns that may reflect this 
biasing in favor of processing goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant stimuli, respectively. In Chapter 
II, awareness of the target produced a decrease in the modularity and increase in the functional 
participation of whole brain graphs relative to unperceived target trials. This pattern of results 
replicated across a comparison of hits to misses as well as a comparison of false alarms to correct 
rejections. Having perceived a target, regardless of whether one was actually presented, 
produced a consistent decrease in the functional separation between networks, brought about by 
increased cross-modular connections. Generally, these results are consistent with global theories 
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of awareness including global workspace theories (Baars, 2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) 
and information integration theory (Tononi, 2008; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). However, what 
this study could not address was whether information that was not relevant for an ongoing task 
would be distributed globally in a similar manner. 
 Chapter III assessed the graph properties of a task-irrelevant oddball stimulus to see 
whether information pertaining to distracting stimuli, rather than a task-relevant stimulus, 
entered a similar globally connected workspace. Rather than being the target of the ongoing task, 
these novel images decreased detection rates of the target, especially for the initial oddball 
presentations (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, & 
Marois, 2010b). Although these stimuli do not contain the goal-relevance as in the first study, the 
powerful orienting response they provoke does require the coordination of numerous distinct 
cognitive and physiological processes in order to orient to and evaluate novel stimuli (Han & 
Marois, 2014; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Sara & Bouret, 2012). Consequently, we might expect 
them to display similar widespread connectivity properties as were observed during detection of 
a task-relevant target. Ultimately, we found that global connectivity changes were associated 
with detection of a task-irrelevant stimulus, but that this pattern was qualitatively different than 
the one observed for target awareness: increased clustering drove an increase in the small-
worldness of subjects’ functional graphs during oddball detection, reflecting an increase in 
functional segregation. This increase in functional segregation was reflected in an increase of the 
modularity statistic, reflecting greater functional distinctiveness between modules. 
 Together, Chapters II and III suggest that the task-relevance of a stimulus (i.e., a stimulus 
that matches a target profile vs. an irrelevant or novel stimulus to be evaluated) may alter global 
patterns of connectivity, helping to communicate this information to appropriate brain structures 
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for ongoing cognition. One alternative explanation for the source of these differences may come 
from a dichotomy between how task instructions are used to proactively bias information versus 
a more reactionary form of control brought about by the stimulus-driven properties of 
information at the moment it is presented (Braver, 2012; Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009). 
This “dual-mechanisms of control” (DMC) model predicts that expectations formed during cue 
presentation bias an individual to adopt either a more “proactive” form of control vs. a “reactive” 
control. This proactive bias is primarily described as primarily a goal-oriented form of control 
(Braver, 2012; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). Alternatively, this model theorizes a second, 
reactive, form of control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009) that is more stimulus-driven in 
nature and tends to be adopted when expectations of distractor interference are low. Here, the 
dissociation between the effects of task-relevant and –irrelevant information is embodied 
primarily in whether the bias is cued in preparation for target presentation or whether stimulus-
driven factors, such as distractor interference, necessitate more online control to filter out 
conflicting information.  
 In the present study, we aimed to test the relationship between functional topology and 
the processing of task-relevant and -irrelevant information. Awareness of task-relevant 
information may be crucially communicated and integrated throughout the brain by a highly 
interconnected set of global connections (Baars, 2005; Dehaene et al., 1998; Edelman, 2003; 
Tononi, 2008). These hypotheses were supported by the results of Chapter II in which detection 
of task-relevant stimuli (e.g. targets) produced decreases in functional modularity and increases 
in the functional participation of the whole brain. Consequently, for the current study this pattern 
of increased functional integration (indexed by decreases in modularity and increases in the 
participation coefficient) will serve a marker of task-relevant information processing. However, 
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the presence of distracting information (e.g. oddball presentations) in Chapter III produced 
increases in functional segregation. We hypothesized that functional isolation (indexed by an 
increase in modularity, clustering coefficient, and small-worldness) may serve to prevent 
irrelevant information from out-competing goal-relevant information. Therefore, we would 
expect processing of task-irrelevant information would display these same patterns of functional 
segregation. A schematic of these hypothesized markers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
processing is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Hypothesized markers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant processing. Based on the 
results of Chapter II and III, the figure shows hypothesized markers of global functional 
connectivity associated with concurrent goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant information processing. 
No scale is given as these patters are intended to be relative changes in connectivity in 
comparison to other task periods. Goal-relevant processing, informed by the results of Chapter II, 
suggest that global functional integration (decreased modularity and increased participation) 
accompanies goal-relevant information. Chapter III showed increased global segregation 
(increased modularity, clustering, and small-worldness) associated with processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli. 
 
 However, the data presented in Chapters II and III only measured functional changes 
concurrent with the presentation of targets and oddballs. The DMC theory suggests that when 
task-irrelevant information is likely, as indicated by an informative cue, proactive control is 
employed to optimally bias, in a sustained manner, the processing of goal-relevant information 
(Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). When the likelihood of task-irrelevant information is low, 
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reactive control only employs biasing procedures at the moment irrelevant information is 
detected (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). Therefore, from a DMC theory perspective, we 
would expect to observe differential patterns of global functional connectivity when distracting 
information is highly likely vs. when it is unlikely.  
 To test the differential predictions of the dual-mechanisms of control theory and 
predictions based only on immediate task-relevance, I reanalyzed a previously published 
experiment designed to probe preparatory influences on activity in visual cortex (Serences, 
Yantis, Culberson, & Awh, 2004b). Participants were asked to add two target numbers and make 
an immediate parity judgment. Targets were identified by spatially predictive cues that contained 
additional information about the likelihood of visual distractors during the task. Distractors were 
invalidly cued on a subset of trials allowing for the examination of cue-related preparatory 
activity as well the consequences of violations of expectations.  
 
Methods 
 
 The data utilized in this study has been previously published as “Experiment 1” in 
Serences et al. (2004). The connectivity and graph theoretical methods described here are a novel 
analysis of this dataset aimed at addressing hypotheses formed based on the previous chapters of 
this dissertation. Additional details of the experimental design can be found in Serences et al. 
(2004) and Awh et al. (2003).  
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Participants 
 Twelve adults (10 female, aged 20-31) participated in this study. All participants 
provided informed consent and The Johns Hopkins University institutional review board 
approved the experimental design. 
 
Behavioral Paradigm 
 The stimulus display consisted of white items overlaid on a black background. The trial 
design is shown in Figure 15. Each trial consisted of a cue period, target array, and pattern mask. 
The length of the cue period was drawn from a pseudo-exponential distribution ranging from 
2500-8500 ms (mean 4,375 ms). Cues consisted of a center fixation square as well as two circle 
and two square stimuli presented at the corners of an invisible square, centered on the fixation 
square. Each pair of matching cue stimuli (circles, squares) was presented diagonally from one 
another. Half of all participants were instructed to attend to locations indicated by the square-
cued locations, with the remaining participants instructed to attend to the circle-cued locations. 
The task required participants to add digits at the cued locations and provide an immediate 
odd/even judgment of the summed result. Digits appeared at all four locations on every trial, thus 
targets were defined by the appropriate cue location (and therefore cues were 100% valid with 
respect to target location). 
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Figure 15. Task design depicting valid trial types. Participants were instructed to monitor two 
cued locations, indicated by either circle or square items in the cue display. The orientation of 
these cued locations indicated whether there were likely (top) or unlikely (bottom) to be 
distractors presented on that particular trial. Participants were instructed to add numbers in the 
target locations together and indicate whether the sum was even or odd with a button press. 
Figure adapted from Serences et al., (2004). 
 
 Participants were instructed that the location of the cue stimuli would indicate the 
likelihood of upcoming distractor stimuli to be presented during the target array. For half of 
participants, if the appropriate cue stimuli were presented in he upper left and lower right corners 
of the invisible square (unlikely-distractor cues), the target array was very likely to only consist 
of numbers presented at the four possible locations (clean target array). For the alternative 
orientation, lower left and upper right cues (likely-distractor cues) would indicate that the target 
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array would likely be filled with irrelevant letters stimuli filling the screen at regular locations 
(noisy target array). Various aspects of cue meaning were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Distractor likelihood was cued with 80% validity; on 20% of unlikely-distractor trials 
participants would view a noisy target display during the target array period and on 20% of 
likely-distractor cues participants would view a clean target display during the target array 
period. Pattern masks consisting of “#” symbols at each target and distractor location were 
presented immediately following the target array and were displayed for 581 ms. No mask was 
presented at empty locations during clean target display trials.  
 Duration of the target array was determined prior to scanning by a staircasing procedure 
performed by each subject, independently for clean and noisy displays (only valid trials were 
presented during the staircasing procedure). This procedure aimed to equate accuracy across 
conditions, keep performance off of ceiling, and produce exposure durations too fast to 
successfully saccade between targets. The staircasing procedure titrated the exposure duration of 
the target to produce about 75% accuracy on both target array types. Displays were initially 
presented for each condition for 1,670 ms. The exposure duration decreased by 10% following 
correct responses and increased by 30% following incorrect response during this process. Eight 
blocks of the staircasing procedure, consisting of 40 trials each, were performed on the day prior 
to scanning. Average exposure durations during the final two blocks during this session were 
then used as a starting point for an additional three blocks of the staircasing procedure after the 
participant had entered the scanner, but prior to scanning. Exposure durations were manually 
adjusted during scanning between runs if participant performance deviated largely from around 
75% accuracy. This procedure resulted in a mean exposure duration of 193 ms (41 ms standard 
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deviation [SD]) during noisy displays. Clean displays, without distractors, resulted in a mean 
exposure duration of 88 ms (31 ms standard deviation) (Serences et al., 2004b).  
 
fMRI Methods 
 The experiment was performed utilizing a Philips Intera 3T scanner at the F.M. Kirby 
Research Center for Functional Brain Imaging at the Kennedy Krieger Institute in Baltimore, 
MD. T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired with a 1mm isotropic voxel resolution. 
Functional scans utilized a SENSE (MRI Devices, Waukesha, WI) head coil with a SENSE 
factor of 2. Echoplanar functional image (EPI) acquisition parameters consisted of a repetition 
time (TR) of 1,830 ms, 25 ms echo time (TE), 70° flip angle, 240 mm FOV, 80 × 80 matrix. 26 
axial slices were collected with a 3 mm thickness and a 1 mm gap. 10 functional runs were 
acquired, each consisting of 40 trials and 200 time points. In addition to the functional scans, two 
localizer scans were acquired for retinotopic mapping which utilized the same scanning 
parameters. These localizer scans are not considered in the present analysis. 
 Data preprocessing was performed using Brain Voyager QX 2.6 (Brain Innovation) and 
consisted of 3D motion correction, correction for slice scan timing, and linear trend removal. 
Anatomical and functional runs were co-registered and transformed into Talairach space 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). Numerous sources of noise have been shown to negatively affect 
accurate estimation of functional connectivity (Power et al., 2012) including subject motion and 
cardiac/respiratory influences. Prior to estimation of functional connectivity measures, six 
estimates of motion, their first derivatives, as well as the timecourses from four regions of no 
interest (two white matter, two ventricular ROIs of similar size to spherically defined ROIs in the 
current study) were regressed out of the data to account for these spurious sources of variance. 
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White matter and ventricular regions of non-interest were manually defined on a per-subject 
basis. 
 
Functional Connectivity Analysis 
 Estimation of functional connectivity was performed similarly to the experiments 
described in the previous chapter, utilizing 264 nodes of interest defined by Power and 
colleagues (2011) with known overlap with cognitive networks of interest. Six-millimeter radius 
spheres were drawn around each coordinate reported to form the 264 nodes with which to the 
whole brain graph for analysis. Connectivity estimates were derived from the condition-specific 
interaction regressors included in the GLM using the gPPI method.  
 Initial analysis of the data included four condition-specific regressors for cue periods and 
four condition-specific regressors for target periods. Cue specific conditions were defined by cue 
type (likely-distractors vs. unlikely-distractors) as well as what target array type was presented 
(clean target vs. noisy target). The original authors for this dataset were concerned that there was 
not adequate time between presentation of the cue and the target to distinguish the sources of 
these two signals (Serences et al., 2004b). Therefore, to test whether target-related activity 
affected estimates of cue activity, separate conditions for valid and invalid cues were included in 
the model. The authors predicted an interaction between cue type and target type would be 
indicative of potential cross-contamination of the two signals. We employ a similar test to assess 
these effects in our own analysis. Target-related conditions were similarly separated by the cue 
type and target-display type. Ultimately, this produced a 2 (distractor likely vs. unlikely) x 2 
(clean vs. noisy target display) x 2 (cue vs. target periods) design. A secondary analysis was 
performed, combining cue and target conditions into a single condition beginning at the cue 
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presentation period and ending with the target-array presentation. This secondary analysis 
constituted a single 2 (likely vs. unlikely cue) x 2 (clean vs. noisy target) design and is based on 
the assumption of signals from the cue and target related periods being confounded in 
connectivity analyses. All PPI analyses were conducted using BrainVoyager QX 2.6 and 
MATLAB custom scripts. 
 
Graph Theoretical Analysis 
 Per-subject graphs were constructed for each of the conditions of interest based on 
parameter estimates of the PPI regressors. All analyses described below were performed on 
graphs proportionally thresholded at the top 10% of connections. All weights, as in analyses 
described in the previous chapters, were rescaled to the range [0,1] by dividing each connection 
by the maximum per-graph connectivity value. Each metric is normalized by calculating the ratio 
of the observed metric per-subject, per-condition to the average of 100 randomized null-graphs 
with equivalent degree distributions. Calculation of each metric as well as construction of 
reference null graphs was performed using the Brain Connectivity Toolbox for MATLAB 
(Rubinov & Sporns, 2010).  
 In the first-pass analysis, individual graphs were constructed for each cell of the initial 2 
x 2 x 2 design. In the secondary analysis, a single cue-target period was defined and 
consequently no separation of cue and target related graphs were possible. Four graphs were 
composed for this secondary analysis, for each cell of the 2 x 2 design.  
 Several factors could determine the expected pattern of graph results for these conditions. 
Given that the results from Chapters II and III were measured concurrently with the presentation 
of task-relevant and irrelevant information, we might expect global patterns of connectivity to be 
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dependent only on the current task relevance of the current visual display. This leads to the first 
set of predictions based on what I will refer to as my “task-relevance” hypothesis. Using the 
distinct patterns of the results observed for task-relevant and -irrelevant information processing 
in Chapters II and II as markers (Fig. 14), the task-relevance hypothesis would predict that 
currently relevant information produces a pattern of global functional integration. From a global 
workspace perspective, this relevant information would inhabit a centralized shared workspace, 
with efficient access to specialized processors in the brain such that relevant information could 
be easily processed, updated, and reprocessed based on going task demands (Baars, 2005; 
Dehaene et al., 1998). Without distraction, task-relevant information would easily win 
competition for central representation and therefore global functional integration would be an 
efficient means of communicating that information. Alternatively, task-irrelevant information, 
such as the presence of distracting information, would produce global functional segregation as a 
potential means of protecting ongoing goal-related information. Without the same efficiency of 
access to central representation and specialized cognitive processors that might be seen without 
distraction, task-irrelevant information may be more easily suppressed at the expense of ongoing 
task performance. This leads to the task-relevance prediction that cue-related information, which 
will always be task-relevant in this paradigm, to display characteristics of global functional 
integration. Noisy displays will then necessarily shift towards a more segregated pattern of 
topology, while clean displays will maintain a pattern of functional integration. 
 As an alternative to the task-relevance hypothesis, the dual-mechanisms of control model 
predicts a proactive form of control to be observed during cue-periods when distractor likelihood 
is high (Braver et al., 2009). If the patterns of connectivity observed in Chapter III, increased 
functional segregation, are in fact a means of protecting task-relevant information and 
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suppressing distracting, task-irrelevant information, we would expect to see increased global 
segregation during the cue period on distractor-likely trials. Previous work has shown that in 
trials with greater expectation of distracting information, regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex 
show more sustained activity during cue-periods whereas decreased activity, time-locked to 
target and distractor presentation, occurs on trials when the distracting information is cued to be 
less likely (Burgess & Braver, 2010). Therefore, in the case of proactive control, no change in 
connectivity would be expected at the onset of the target/distractor array. I would then expect 
that on distractor-unlikely trials, according to this model, global connectivity patterns associated 
with task-irrelevant processing to occur coincident with the (invalid) presentation of a noisy 
display. This effect occurs due to the utilization of a reactive form of control, implemented in the 
absence of distractor expectation, detecting interference and providing an online shift in 
processing topology (Braver, 2012). The predictions of the task-relevance and dual-mechanisms 
of control hypotheses are summarized in Fig. 16. 
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Figure 16. Patterns of topology predicted during cue and target display periods. 
 
 
Results 
 
 Behavioral results are described in detail in Serences et al. (2004). Briefly, participants 
showed decreased accuracy on the parity judgment on distractor-present (noisy) trials when 
distractors were cued to be unlikely compared to all other trial types. No difference in 
performance was observed for distractor absent (clean) between distractor likely and unlikely 
cues. A significant interaction was observed between cue and target display type, with poor 
performance identified primarily in distractor-unlikely, noisy displays. Performance in validly 
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and invalidly cued clean displays as well as validly cued noisy displays were roughly equivalent, 
all around performance determined by the staircasing procedure (~75% correct). 
 In the first-pass, 2 x 2 x 2 graph theoretical analysis, modularity for the cue-period 
showed no main effect of cue type (distractor likely vs. unlikely; F(1,11) = 1.322,  p = .275), nor of 
target display (F(1,11) = .297; p = .597). However, modularity during the cue-period did show a 
marginal interaction between cue type and the target display type (F(1,11) = 4.635; p = .054). This 
effect can be interpreted as a validity effect, with greater modularity seen for validly cued trials 
compared to invalidly cued trials. This marginal interaction effect is concerning for interpreting 
cue-period activity as it suggests that target related activity may be contaminating the cue epoch. 
No validity effect or cue by target interaction should be observed given that at the time of the cue 
the participant has seen no information about the target. The participation coefficient too showed 
no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) = .318; p = .584) nor target type (F(1,11) = .054; p = .821) while 
additionally showing a marginal interaction between cue and target types (F(1,11) = 4.151; p = 
.066). Ultimately, only interactions between cue and target type were observed for metrics 
previously associated with a task-relevant pattern of global functional connectivity. 
 During the cue period, the clustering coefficient showed no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) 
= 1.153; p = .306) and no main effect of target type (F(1,11) = 1.425; p = .258). Again, however, 
the clustering coefficient displayed a marginal interaction between cue and target type (F(1,11) = 
3.492; p = .089). The characteristic path length showed a similar pattern of effects. No main 
effect of characteristic path length was observed during the cue-period (F(1,11) = .225; p = .645) 
nor was a main effect of target observed (F(1,11) = .021; p = .888). A significant interaction 
between cue and target type was observed during the cue-period for the characteristic path length 
(F(1,11) = 7.316; p = .02). These interactions appear to be driven by a validity effect, with valid 
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trials showing greater clustering as well as a larger characteristic path length. The small-
worldness metric showed no main effects of cue type (F(1,11) = 1.165; p = .304), target type 
(F(1,11) = 1.452; p = .254), nor an interaction between cue and target (F(1,11) = 2.933; p = .115). 
Again, for metrics previously associated with a task-irrelevant pattern of functional connectivity, 
we observed only interactions between cue and target types.  
 
 
Figure 17. Cue period results for initial analysis for the top 10% of connections. Interactions 
between cue type and validity were seen for several metrics indicating contamination from target 
activity. 
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 During the period following target-array presentation, no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) < 
.001; p = .996) or target type (F(1,11) = 2.159; p = .17)  was observed in modularity, a metric 
predicted to be an indicator of goal-driven changes in functional connectivity. A significant 
interaction was observed between cue and target types (F(1,11) = 7.385; p = .02), with the greatest 
modularity occurring for target-unlikely cues followed by noisy displays. Participation showed 
no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) = .247; p = .629), but a marginal effect of target display type 
(F(1,11) = 3.832; p = .076). Additionally, the participation coefficient showed a significant 
interaction between cue and target types (F(1,11) = 6.569; p = .026), with the greatest functional 
participation occurring on trials with target-likely cues but clean displays. This trial type 
additionally showed the lowest values of modularity, reflecting the close relationship between an 
increase in cross modular communication and a decrease in measures of how separable those 
modules are.    
 The clustering coefficient showed no main effects of cue (F(1,11) = .826; p = .383)  or 
target type (F(1,11) = .053; p = .823). However, similar to the goal-driven measures of functional 
connectivity, a significant interaction between cue and target type was observed (F(1,11) = 28.142; 
p < .001). The characteristic path length showed no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) = .344; p = 
.57), but a marginal effect of target type (F(1,11) = 3.989; p = .071). No significant interaction 
effect was observed for the characteristic path length. The small-worldness metric mirrored the 
clustering coefficient, as expected given the lack of effects for the characteristic path length. No 
main effect of cue (F(1,11) = 1.27; p = .284)  or target (F(1,11) = .038; p = .849)  type was observed 
for small-worldness but a significant interaction (F(1,11) = 30.497; p < .001) was observed. This 
interaction appears to underscore a crossover effect, with the greatest clustering values occurring 
for distractor-unlikely cues followed by noisy displays (an invalidly cued trial). The lowest 
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clustering values occurred for distractor-likely cued trials and especially in the valid trials with 
noisy target displays. 
 
 
Figure 18. Target period results for first analysis at top 10% of connections. 
 
 The lack of interpretable cue effects during the cue period precludes any assessment of 
predictions made by the dual-mechanisms of control model or an task-relevance hypothesis. 
Additionally, evidence of a cue/target interaction in nearly all of the observed metrics indicates a 
high likelihood that the cue period was contaminated by target-related information in the current 
analysis. Although such an effect was not found in the original analysis of this manuscript 
(Serences et al., 2004b), those analyses tested peak differences in event related averages of 
BOLD-activation timecourses. These analyses somewhat bypass the influence of the target 
1.25	
1.3	
1.35	
1.4	
1.45	
1.5	
1.55	
1.6	
1.65	
Sparse	 Crowded	
M
od
ul
ar
ity
	
0.68	
0.7	
0.72	
0.74	
0.76	
0.78	
0.8	
0.82	
0.84	
0.86	
Sparse	 Crowded	
Pa
r-
ci
pa
-o
n	
0.98	
0.985	
0.99	
0.995	
1	
1.005	
1.01	
1.015	
1.02	
1.025	
Sparse	 Crowded	
Ch
ar
.	P
at
h	
Le
ng
th
	
0	
0.2	
0.4	
0.6	
0.8	
1	
1.2	
Sparse	 Crowded	
Sm
al
l-w
or
ld
ne
ss
	
0.9	
0.95	
1	
1.05	
1.1	
1.15	
Sparse	 Crowded	
Cl
us
te
rin
g	
Clean	Display	
Noisy	Display	
	 95	
related activity apparent during the latter timepoints in the event related averages. Despite the 
lack of observed interaction, Serences et al. nevertheless retested their prediction in a slow-event 
related design specifically formulated to disentangle cue and target related activity, expressing 
concern over contamination of these measures (unfortunately, for technical reasons this data was 
not available for graph theory analysis). Given the current study’s use of PPI methodology to 
estimate functional connectivity, a temporal dissociation between cue and target related activity 
may not be possible. Consequently, we performed a second analysis that combined cue and 
target periods into a single condition predictor, beginning with the cue presentation and ending 
with the target presentation timepoint.  
 This analysis (Fig. 19) was evaluated similarly to the above method, assessing graph 
metrics for main effects of target, cue, and interactions between these factors. Modularity 
showed no main effects of cue (F(1,11) = .92; p = .358) or target (F(1,11) = 1.124; p = .312). 
However, the interaction showed a significant effect (F(1,11) = 7.011; p = .023), which appears to 
be driven by a decrease in modularity in the distractor likely but clean display trial type. The 
participation coefficient showed no main effects of cue (F(1,11) = .344; p = .569) or target (F(1,11) = 
1.252; p = .287) type but also showed a significant interaction (F(1,11) = 8.969; p = .012) between 
these factors.  
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Figure 19. Results from secondary analysis combining cue and target presentations for the top 
10% of connections. 
 
 
 The clustering coefficient showed no main effect of cue (F(1,11) = .879; p = .369) or target 
(F(1,11) = .756; p = .403) type. A marginal interaction effect was observed for the clustering 
coefficient (F(1,11) = 4.513; p = .057). The characteristic path length showed no effects of cue 
(F(1,11) = .387; p = .547), target (F(1,11) = .366; p = .558), or an interaction (F(1,11) = 2.062; p = 
.179) between cue and target. Small-worldness, tracking the clustering coefficient, showed no 
main effect of target (F(1,11) = 1.275; p = .283) or cue (F(1,11) = .563; p = .469) type and only a 
marginal interaction (F(1,11) = 3.483; p = .089) between target and cue. 
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 The primary finding of this second analysis appears to be a pattern of interaction between 
cue and target, with significant interactions found for functional modularity and participation 
coefficient. Marginal interactions were apparent in the clustering coefficient and small-worldness 
of the graph. In each of these interactions, the effect appears to be largely driven by one 
condition in particular: likely-distractor/clean target.  
 As with the previous chapters, we aimed to evaluate whether the global pattern of results 
was primarily driven by a small number of networks we might a priori have believed to be 
drivers of connectivity change from a network-level perspective. The original Serences et al. 
(2004) manuscript found activation differences in visual cortex as a result of cue differences 
(distractor likely vs. unlikely). We thus explored the specific changes in functional connectivity 
that might be found in visual cortex. Examining only the nodes in a visual network defined by 
Power et al., (2011), we probed the participation and clustering coefficients, metrics designed to 
measure inter-modular and intra-modular connectivity changes respectively.  The participation 
coefficient of the visual network showed no main effect of cue (F(1,11) = 2.625; p = .133) nor a 
main effect of target type (F(1,11) = .646; p = .439), but did display an interaction between cue and 
target type (F(1,11) = 11.524; p = .006) that is driven by a decrease in participation in the 
distractor-likely/noisy display condition. This pattern of results in the functional participation of 
the visual network mirrors the pattern of significance seen in the global statistics, suggesting the 
visual network connectivity likely tracks the global pattern of results. The clustering coefficient, 
again similar to the global pattern of changes, showed no main effect of cue type (F(1,11) = .501; p 
= .494), no main effect of target type (F(1,11) = 2.211; p = .165), and no interaction between cue 
and target (F(1,11) = 1.535; p = .241). The lack of target display effects raises concerns about the 
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sensitivity of our analysis with the current dataset as we would generally expect noisy and clean 
displays to elicit strong differences in visual cortex. 
  
Discussion 
 
 Several findings complicate the overall interpretation of the current results. First and 
foremost, in our initial analysis many graph theoretical metrics displayed an interaction between 
cue and target type during the cue-period. This interaction suggests that activity due to target and 
distractor presentation contaminated cue-period measures of functional connectivity. This 
contamination likely stems from a fundamental step of the PPI analysis, construction of the 
interaction regressor. Correlations in activity are measured over the time period during which a 
typical hemodynamic response might occur (Gitelman et al., 2003; McLaren et al., 2012). Given 
the relatively short period between cue and target in the current dataset, we might not expect to 
be able to differentiate these signals, as the cue interaction period will overlap with the 
subsequent target. A typical BOLD activation analysis would typically deal with this confound in 
signal estimation by two means: a variable delay between cue and target and/or a deconvolution 
analysis (Burock, Buckner, Woldorff, Rosen, & Dale, 1998; Friston, Zarahn, Josephs, Henson, & 
Dale, 1999; Serences, 2004). Although the current dataset utilized a variable delay, the signal of 
interest in a PPI study does not conform to the typical hemodynamic response function (HRF; 
and this signal is specifically disregarded) and may not  directly benefit from the increased 
ability to disentangle the HRF due to cue and target. Given this limitation, examination of the 
primary analysis in the current study is likely un-interpretable. Our secondary analysis aimed to 
combine signals from cue and target into a single experimental predictor, as this analysis should 
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allow us to interpret results by including the conflation of cue and target presentation signals in 
our model. The findings from this analysis were solely an interaction between cue and target 
types for the modularity and participation coefficient, with a marginal effect in clustering and 
small-worldness. These effects appear to be driven by the interaction between distractor-likely 
cues paired with a clean display. However, because our ultimate findings were primarily driven 
by the results in a single condition, I am ultimately unable to interpret the full range of 
predictions made by the dual-mechanisms of control and task-relevance models with these 
findings.  
 Finally, the lack of target display effects in the visual network promotes additional 
concern that the current analysis has a limited ability to discern potential changes in connectivity 
effects in the context of the current analysis. If any stimulus difference were to produce effects in 
visual areas, it would be the comparison of a crowded visual display vs. a relatively clean 
display. The lack of main effect due to target could be due to the confluence of top-down effects 
on these visual areas due to cue combined with any feed-forward effects, complicating 
expectations of activity in these areas.  
 Given the limitations of interpretation in the current study, an ideally designed follow-up 
would include additional time between cue and target to allow for an adequate estimation of 
connectivity for cues and targets. Experiment 2 in Serences et al. (2004) provides additional time 
between cue and target to better estimate activity of these two task periods independently. This 
data was, unfortunately, unavailable for analysis. A second alternative to the difficulties faced by 
the current study would be adopt a class of task-concurrent connectivity analyses based on 
correlating concatenated time-series after regressing out task-signal (Cole et al., 2014; Friston, 
2011a; Norman-Haignere, McCarthy, Chun, & Turk-Browne, 2011). These analysis methods do 
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not typically separate the intrinsic connectivity structure from task-evoked perturbations, and 
consequently display modularity highly correlated with the resting state (Cole et al., 2014). 
These analyses were not pursued for two reasons. First, the variance associated with intrinsic 
connectivity has been shown to be much larger than the variance associated with task-induced 
changes in connectivity (Cole et al., 2014). Consequently, examination of graph metrics would 
be largely driven by the organization of the intrinsic functional connectivity of the brain, rather 
than by the task evoked signal. Next, in order to compare between conditions such that the 
intrinsic connectivity does not dominate the graph organization, we would take the difference 
between conditions to “cancel out” the intrinsic signal. This step then requires interpretation of 
graph theoretical results of difference scores between conditions rather than direct estimations of 
the task-induced connectivity. These methods do, however, have the advantage of being more 
flexible in terms of the time-periods during which connectivity can be correlated compared to the 
PPI style analysis utilized in the current study. Further study with well-controlled design and 
analysis will be necessary to best answer the questions posed in this chapter.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Modern theories of brain function contend that specific cognitive operations can be 
localized to functionally and anatomically specialized sites in the brain. However, coordination 
across multiple regions is necessary for the production of coherent behavior 
(Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Friston, 2005; John, Easton, & Isenhart, 1997; McIntosh, 2000; 
Mesulam, 1990; Posner et al., 1988; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001). Network 
science and graph theory provide a flexible and generalizable vantage from which to address 
questions about the coordination of activity across neural systems. A primary goal of the studies 
presented in this dissertation was to find evidence for and characterize whole brain changes in 
connectivity patterns associated with attention and awareness.  
 Chapter II addressed the theoretical debate between neurobiological theories of conscious 
awareness. Focal, network-level, and global theories provided distinct and testable predictions as 
to the expected patterns of functional connectivity. Focal and network-level theories would 
predict that the changes associated with conscious awareness of a target would be restricted to 
individual nodes of the global network or to a circumscribed set of fronto-parietal attention 
networks, respectively. However, detection of a simple target stimulus produced a much more 
diffuse pattern of effects than would have been expected from the standpoint of these theories. 
Functional connections spanning the entire brain appeared to participate in a global decrease in 
the functional modularity of the brain, measuring of how well one can disentangle the various 
specialized networks in the brain. Concurrent with, and likely contributing to, these changes in 
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modularity were increases in global measures of participation, or cross-modular connections. 
Consciousness has been previously correlated with increases in long-range oscillatory synchrony 
(Gross et al., 2004; King et al., 2013; Melloni et al., 2007; Schröter et al., 2012), a mechanism 
that appears to fit well as a potential source of the signal indexed by changes in participation. 
 The observed changes associated with conscious detection of a target (or the percept of 
detection of a target, in the case of false alarms) tightly align with the predictions of global 
models of conscious awareness. Rather than requiring specialized processing in a restricted set of 
regions, these theories argue that large-scale coordination across multiple modalities converge on 
a unified representation of currently accessible information. Formalized, the Global Workspace 
hypothesis (Baars, 2005; Baars, 1983; 2002; Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), 
Dynamic Core hypothesis (Edelman, 2003; Tononi & Edelman, 1998) and the Information 
Integration Theory (Tononi, 2008; Tononi & Sporns, 2003) each require information to be 
integrated via whole brain, recurrent connections as a prerequisite for awareness of that 
information. Of course, these results do not discount the findings of numerous task activation 
studies that found fronto-parietal activations in contrasts of seen versus unseen stimuli. Rather, 
the current results compliment these findings and highlight the need to examine large-scale 
functional dynamics as coordination across the entire brain is necessary for the production of a 
coherent cognitive experience (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Friston, 2005; John et al., 1997; 
McIntosh, 2000; Mesulam, 1990; Posner et al., 1988; Varela et al., 2001). These global changes 
in connectivity may work in tandem with the specific recruitment of fronto-parietal networks, 
facilitating efficient connectivity between these regions, sensory areas, and control regions 
necessary for flexibly responding behaviorally to incoming relevant stimuli.  
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 Although the results in this study were global, no differences were found in the 
characteristic path length or functional clustering of whole-brain graphs in aware compared to 
unaware conditions. These two measures are component characteristics of the brain’s small-
worldness, a holistic property of the brain that it shares with many other organized systems 
(Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; Humphries & Gurney, 2008; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). This 
functional balance between computational specialization and integration of information across 
domains can be found at numerous levels of analysis including structural (He et al., 2007; Sporns 
& Zwi, 2004; Supekar, Musen, & Menon, 2009; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), resting state (Achard, 
Salvador, Whitcher, Suckling, & Bullmore, 2006; Liao et al., 2011; Spoormaker et al., 2010; 
Uehara et al., 2014; van den Heuvel et al., 2008), and task-concurrent studies (Bassett et al., 
2009; Cole et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2011). Several factors may have contributed to the modularity 
and participation effects in the absence of clustering and characteristic path lengths effects, 
including the high levels of functional efficiency already inherent in the network (Estrada & 
Hatano, 2008), insensitivity of clustering and characteristic path length measures to specifically 
cross-modular connections (Humphries & Gurney, 2008), and the lack of distracting information, 
allowing an unimpeded shift benefitting functional integration. 
 Chapter III describes the connectivity changes associated with detection of a task-
irrelevant oddball that interrupts ongoing goal-directed behavior. Novel, salient stimuli bring 
about a host of both physiological (Beatty, 1982; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Tracy et al., 2000) 
and cognitive changes (Han & Marois, 2014; Kahneman, 1973; Sara & Bouret, 2012) required to 
produce an effective response to unexpected information. By presenting this information during 
the engagement of an otherwise (goal-driven) attentionally demanding task, this study assessed 
how the stimulus-driven recruitment of attention altered the functional human connectome. 
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Salient information may (or may not) be important for both immediate goals (like completing an 
experimental task) and higher-order goals (like survival) and consequently must be evaluated 
before such information is allowed to influence future behavior. If task-relevant information is 
globally communicated or represented, as shown in Chapter II, detection of a potentially relevant 
(but ultimately irrelevant) stimulus could produce complex changes to this pattern of 
connectivity. Detecting a novel stimulus requires evaluation of that stimulus while at the same 
time maintaining your current goals. 
 Largely mirroring the patterns of behavioral effects with repeated oddball presentations 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a; Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, & Marois, 2010b), 
initial presentations of a salient oddball caused significant changes in global functional 
connections. These initial oddballs significantly altered functional modularity, this time via an 
increase in the local clustering causing networks to ultimately be more functionally segregated 
from each other. Subsequent presentations of oddballs showed decreased measures of functional 
segregation (decreased modularity, clustering, small-worldness) relative to initial oddballs, but 
greater than those observed during no-target trials. Unlike the changes with target awareness 
described in Chapter II, detection of an oddball stimulus (or at least the initial presentations of an 
oddball) did produce changes in the functional small-world structure of brain. An increase in the 
small-worldness suggests that detection of this oddball produces a more functionally segregated 
connectome, perhaps reflecting recruitment of many specialized processes necessary to evaluate 
novel information that might necessitate behavioral change (Han & Marois, 2014; Pavlov, 1927; 
Sara & Bouret, 2012; Sokolov, 1963).  
 These results stand in contrast to a hypothetical “integration” hypothesis which, based on 
the results from Chapter II, hypothesized that information – regardless of its content – would 
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necessitate functional integration for global broadcasting (Baars, 2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 
2011; Edelman, 2003; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). Instead, we found a pattern of results more in 
line with a “segregation” hypothesis that predicted increases in measures of small-worldness 
perhaps because of the multitude of specialized processes brought online in order to evaluate 
novel stimuli (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963). Of course, participants do consciously perceive 
oddball stimuli, and thus one could have expected that there would be high degree of integration 
in the global network as well. The current results represent a potential shift in the prioritization 
of the two driving influences on small-world organization: integration (for information sharing 
between networks) and segregation (for specialized processing). 
 The discrepancies in results found in Chapters II and III presented an interesting 
question: does task-relevant and task-irrelevant information processing produce differential 
patterns of global connectivity? Chapter II found evidence supporting global theories of 
awareness, which argue that in order for information to be consciously perceived, it needs be 
globally broadcast throughout the brain favoring the demands of functional integration. Similar 
patterns of global integration have been found for other goal-driven behaviors (Ekman et al., 
2012; Kitzbichler et al., 2011). Chapter III found a contrasting pattern of results, suggesting that 
when task-irrelevant, novel information (e.g. an oddball) interrupts goal-oriented behavior, it 
produces a more functionally segregated brain (also see Nicol et al., 2011). Perhaps the 
behavioral relevance of a stimulus has a direct influence on the global functional connectome in 
order to effectively facilitate complex demands of the environment. As noted above, distracting 
or irrelevant stimuli must be specifically suppressed while attempting to maintain performance 
levels dependent on the processing of goal-relevant information. 
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 Analyses presented in Chapter IV were intended to disentangle the potential effects of 
task-relevant changes in the functional connectome from task-irrelevant effects. In particular, 
either task-relevant information (targets) was expected to produce a pattern of goal-driven global 
functional integration, to be identified by changes in functional modularity and participation. 
Complementary, we hypothesized an increase in small-worldness and measures of functional 
segregation with presentations of task-irrelevant distractors, particularly when these stimuli were 
unexpected. Participants were cued to the locations of target digits along with information as to 
the likelihood that distracting, task-irrelevant letters would simultaneously be displayed (Awh, 
Matsukura, & Serences, 2003; Serences et al., 2004b). On a subset of trials, cues invalidly 
informed participants as to the upcoming presence of distractors, providing a mismatch between 
the expectations and control exerted during the cue period versus the need to reactively adapt 
behavior to the presence of unforeseen task-irrelevant information (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 
2009). Ideally, the design would have allowed comparison of distractor-likely and unlikely cues 
separately from distractor-present and absent trials.  
 Results of these analyses suggested that the task design was insufficient to accurately 
disentangle connectivity differences in cue and target-display related activity. Specifically, cue-
period graph theoretical measures showed an interaction between cued likelihood and distractor 
presence in the subsequent target epoch, suggesting that activity during the target presentation 
period contaminated connectivity measurements during the cue period. Consequently, further 
analyses were unable to disentangle whether observed differences in graph theoretical measures 
were due to cue or target related activity, interpretations with divergent expectations given our a 
priori task-relevance and dual-mechanisms of control hypotheses. Several possible alternate 
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routes for testing these hypotheses in the context of a similar attentional task were proposed in 
Chapter IV.  
 Ultimately, despite a complicated pattern of results in Chapter IV, Chapters II and III 
have highlighted novel neurobiological characteristics of well-studied psychological phenomena. 
Despite well-characterized network-level activations in awareness and attention research, the 
results presented here suggest that there are other dimensions of these processes still to study. 
Although the current results have focused on one kind of graph theoretical result (global changes 
in connectivity), there are several other avenues of study available to expand upon typical 
activation based research. For example, the study of hub regions, or nodes vitally important for 
the efficient transfer of information, may aid in the identification and explanation of information 
processing bottlenecks.  
 Multitasking costs are ubiquitous and profound despite the frequency with which humans 
engage in multiple concurrent tasks (M. C. Smith, 1967; Welford, 1952). The central bottleneck 
hypothesis presumes that each task recruits a common, structural mechanism responsible for the 
response selection phase of task performance. This structure is only available to perform one 
mapping at a time, resulting in serial performance of each task (Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Pashler, 
1994; M. C. Smith, 1967). Imaging research into the identity of potential bottlenecks has 
identified a few likely candidates including: lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC), inferior frontal 
junction (IFJ), dorsal premotor cortex (FEF), anterior medial prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, 
and intraparietal sulcus (Dux & Marois, 2009; Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; Jiang & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Marois, Larson, Chun, & Shima, 2005; Sigman & 
Dehaene, 2008; Tombu et al., 2011). These studies typically involve identifying foci revealed by 
the contrast of dual vs. single task or long vs. short stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) in a 
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psychological refractory period (PRP) design. These foci make sense as potential central 
bottlenecks of information processing given their purported involvement in various aspects of 
cognition including cognitive control (Derrfuss, Brass, & Yves von Cramon, 2004; Dosenbach et 
al., 2007; 2008), attention (Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), and are generally 
recruited across a wide range of cognitively demanding tasks (Duncan, 2010; Duncan & Owen, 
2000; Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996).  
 Although performance of dual tasks produces recognizable deficits, performance of 
specific tasks over an extended period of time shows improvement through practice (Jonides, 
2004; Schumacher et al., 2001; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2004). Dux et al. (2009) find that practice 
effects appear consistent with an “improved efficiency” hypothesis in which connection 
strengths between regions involved in task performance are improved and progressively routed 
away from speed-limiting bottlenecks (Poldrack, 2005). Consequently, through practice the very 
bottleneck regions identified by multitasking deficits appear to be routed around as a means of 
speeding processing. The network perspective afforded by graph theory offers an opportunity to 
examine the degree to which whole-brain, network, and individual hub node efficiency improves 
with practice of a task compared to early performance and in particular, test theories as to 
whether processing becomes more efficient in these nodes vs. new routes of information transfer 
are formed (Dux et al., 2009). 
 Additionally, examination of hub regions may play a future role in better elucidating the 
interactions between individual networks, such as the dorsal and ventral attention networks. 
Corbetta and Shulman (2002; 2008) have hypothesized that the ventral attention network acts as 
a “circuit breaker,” responsible for interrupting current task goals when salient stimuli occur 
outside the current goal-directed focus of attention. Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) has shown 
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several anatomical connections between the dorsal and ventral attention networks (de Schotten et 
al., 2011) suggesting a plausible role of ventral attention regions responsible for pivoting 
attention away from the current focus via interactions with the dorsal network. This interaction 
was hypothesized to occur between the TPJ and nearby intraparietal regions (Astafiev et al., 
2006; Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). In fact, posterior parietal damage 
resulting in neglect symptoms produces breakdown of resting-state functional connectivity in 
both dorsal and ventral attention regions suggesting an important role of this region for 
connections between both attention networks (Corbetta & Shulman, 2011; He et al., 2007). 
However, other work implicates IFJ as a linking node between dorsal and ventral attention 
networks. Asplund et al. (2010) showed a switch in patterns of IFJ activity during capture of 
attention by a surprising, irrelevant stimulus and goal-directed search. During goal-directed 
search, IFJ showed similar activity to dorsal attention regions but coactivates with TPJ during 
capture by the surprising stimulus (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010a). Other work has 
shown that during covert shifts of spatial attention the ventral frontal cortex showed increased 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) connectivity with dorsal attention regions for validly cued 
trials, again suggesting a coordinating role for IFJ (Weissman & Prado, 2012). If either of these 
regions (IFJ or TPJ) is a crucial, pivot points for the “circuit-breaking” process, we would expect 
to see a decrease in the average path length of these regions (suggesting efficient communication 
relies on these areas) and potentially an increase in the clustering coefficient (implying that these 
areas become more interconnected overall) in comparisons of oddball vs. target detection. 
 Additional probes of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information as well as differences 
between top-down and bottom-up attention will be necessary to determine the accuracy of these 
hypotheses. However, towards developing these hypotheses, these studies provided a novel 
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characterization of attention and awareness from the perspective of changes in global functional 
connectivity. These studies have, hopefully, highlighted the utility of graph theory as a means of 
succinctly describing the complex behaviors of the brain’s functional connectivity. Further work 
will be necessary to map the relationship between complex network structures of the brain and 
the specialized neural circuitry required to produce multifaceted human behavior. Ideally, future 
work would incorporate a more holistic, potentially graph theoretical, examination of the whole-
brain connectivity data to account for the global changes observed in this dissertation. 
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